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Abstract

Military operations in the past, present, and future are highly dependent on the
timely distribution of accurate information; the only thing really changing is the speed
and means of which it is dispersed. As we proceed forward in the information age,
technology and the men and women responsible for it will play an ever increasing role in
getting the right information in the right place at the right time. As the United States Air
Force continues to transform into an ever increasing expeditionary service the
knowledge, skills, and abilities of Air Force officers must transform as well to meet the
evolving needs of combatant commanders. 33S officers perform garrison duties in many
different capacities; current duty position or past experience thus does not guarantee we
have acquired the knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to succeed when and where it
matters most. Hence, the purpose of this research is to identify core skill sets in the form
of knowledge, skills, and abilities, which are most important to Communication and
Information (AFSC 33S) Officers to successfully carry out assigned duties in forward
operating locations.
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IDENTIFYING TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, AND ABILITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR 33S OFFICERS IN DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENTS

I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War ushered in a dramatic change in global security. In
response the United States reacted with radical changes in our own national security
policy. The global security environment today requires the U.S. military be capable of
responding rapidly to events anywhere in the world on a moments notice. The United
States Air Force has responded to changes in national security policy by transitioning into
a much more mobile, responsive, and flexible organization under what is called the
Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept. The driving force behind the EAF concept is
the Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF). The AEFs provide a wide variety of autonomous
military capabilities to theater commanders for rapid response anytime, anywhere in the
world. AEFs are dependent on preparedness to achieve success; of utmost importance is
our ability to organize, train, and equip forces effectively and efficiently to facilitate rapid
response when and where the need arises.
Organizing, training, and equipping forces form the foundation of the AEF
concept. Like any three legged structure a deficiency in any one supporting element will
cause the entire structure to fail. The most well equipped and trained military in the
world is incapable of victory if disorganized to the point of ineptitude. Likewise, a well
organized, well trained unit is doomed to fail if ill-equipped for the task at hand. Finally,
a well organized, well equipped unit has little, if any, chance of success without a
properly trained work force.
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This study focuses on one of the three pillars I’ve mentioned: training. Adequate
preparation is critical to success in deployed environments. Tours of duty are relatively
short in deployed locations, normally around 120 days; overlap time with in-place
personnel is limited or nonexistent therefore on-the-job training (OJT) is limited or
nonexistent. With the vast areas of responsibility encompassing the communications and
information career field it’s imperative in today’s expeditionary environment that
Communications and Information Systems (33S) officers arrive in deployed locations
with the skills necessary to succeed.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is to identify a core set of technical skills required by
Communications and Information Systems officers to successfully complete their mission
in a deployed location. In addition, this study seeks to identify a level of technical self
efficacy among communications officers prior to their arrival in a deployed location; in
other words how well does the 33S community feel prepared technically for deployment?
Finally, this study intends to identify how important 33S officers perceive technical skill
sets to be in a deployed environment.
Previous studies conducted by Schmidt (1997), Phillips (1998), and Little (1999)
attempted to identify important skill areas and training adequacies of communications
and information officers. Schmidt (1997) found through a survey administered to
company grade officers in the C&I career field that interpersonal skills were most
important to 33S officers followed by managerial skills then technical skills. Phillips
(1998), confirmed the findings of Schmidt; Phillips addressed the training adequacy
through commander’s perspective and found commanders also felt interpersonal skills
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were most important to C&I officers followed by managerial skills and technical skills.
Schmidt’s and Phillip’s works identified what skills were important to C&I professionals
while Little (1999) attempted expand on previous research by identifying where training
deficiencies existed. Little found that only about half of the C&I officers found their
training to be satisfactory or better while 48% rated their training marginal or
unsatisfactory. Additionally, Phillips found that commanders typically felt the skills
most lacking by officers in their organizations was in the area of technical skills.
Over the last two decades the role of Communications and Information officers
has expanded dramatically throughout the Air Force and DoD. The extreme diversity of
the career field results in significant variations in required knowledge, skills and abilities
(KSAs) depending on duty position. The crux of this problem is amplified in a deployed
environment where the opportunity for training and skill development is greatly inhibited
due to the temporary nature of the assignment, operations tempo, and the high turnover
rate of the duty positions. This study will be unique from previous works in that it
attempts to specifically identify technical knowledge, skills, and abilities required of C &
I officers explicitly in the context of a forward operating environment.
Technical Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Defined
Nowhere in Air Force literature is the term “technical” skills explicitly defined.
Career Field Education and Training Plans are riddled with the term, AFI 33-2923
requires we complete “technical” school before wearing the career field heraldry badge,
and the Air Force Communications Agency (AFCA) has been charged with the
administration of The Officer Technical Refresh program to fill existing gaps in
“technical” skills. Perhaps there is no need for the Air Force to specifically define
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technical skills, or possibly there is no single definition adequate to fully encompass all
that the term entails. With that said, the nature of this study requires a clear definition of
the term “technical” to differentiate the skill sets to be obtained in this study from the
skill sets required by officers as a whole. In the absence of a formal Air Force definition,
the author defaults to the Merriam-Webster definition:

Technical - 1 a : having special and usually practical knowledge
especially of a mechanical or scientific subject b : marked by or
characteristic of specialization
With respect to the Communications and Information career field definition
b: above meets the author’s intent therefore “technical” will be defined as
special knowledge, skills and/or abilities required to manage, operate,
and/or maintain voice/data/video networks, mission systems, multi media
operations, information management operations, or communications
planning and implementation.
Research Questions
My focus in conducting this research is on the training aspect of the
organize/train/equip triad, specifically the technical knowledge, skills and abilities
required of C&I officers to support the AEF concept. A series of questions will serve as
my guide in conducting this research:
Research Question 1 – Are C&I officers technically prepared for deployments in
forward operating locations?
Research Question 2 – To what extent are technical knowledge, skills, and
abilities necessary for C&I officers to succeed in a deployed environment?
4

Research Question 3 – What technical knowledge, skills, and abilities are most
important in succeeding as a C&I officer in a deployed environment?
Scope of Research
The scope of this research is to expressly obtain the opinions of 33S officers with
current or previous deployed experience under the Expeditionary Air Force concept.
Respondents to the survey are limited to 33S officers who’ve met this criterion. There is
no rank, time-in-grade, or time-in service restrictions involved with the administration of
this survey. The intention of this study is to gather insight provided by experience
regardless of rank and/or years of experience; also, capturing data across the
rank/experience spectrum can potentially prove to be useful by identifying varying
requirements dependent on rank/position.
Assumptions
Preparedness is critical to success in today’s global security environment. A key
element in preparedness is having the proper skills sets to meet the mission. It is well
documented through previous research that interpersonal and managerial skills are
critically important throughout the Air Force and not unique to any specific career field.
This study makes the assumption that the importance of interpersonal and managerial
skills remain constant overtime and are unaffected by changes in national security policy
or the EAF construct therefore this study will not address these skill sets. However, it is
recognized these skills are addressed through professional military education and
commissioning sources and this study will assume all officers have had a minimum level
of managerial and interpersonal training commensurate with the first level of officer
professional military education (i.e. Air and Space Basic Course).
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The Executive Officer duty position is recognized as part of the 33S career field;
however, any officer AFSC can perform executive officer duties. The author will make
the assumption there are no technical skills required by this duty position that are specific
to the communications and information career field and therefore executive officer skill
sets are not specifically addressed in the technical knowledge, skills, and abilities
assessment.
The survey instrument used in this study is based largely on technical tasks
contained within several communications related Department of the Air Force Career
Field Education and Training Plans (CFETP); therefore, it is assumed all the technical
knowledge, skills, and abilities represented in the survey are relevant to the
communications and information systems career field.
Limitations
This study attempts to capture the feelings and perceptions of previously deployed
33S officers as it relates to technical competence in a deployed environment. It is
intended to provide the Air Force with a snapshot of technical training adequacy as it
relates to preparedness in the EAF construct. This study is not intended to evaluate the
quality, efficacy, or availability of 33S training programs or courses. Neither has any
attempt been made to address improvements in training over time as no longitudinal data
is available from previous research.
The technical knowledge, skills, and abilities drawn from the CFETPs to be
represented in the survey were chosen largely based on the author’s experience in the
career field therefore it is entirely possible, or more likely probable, one or several
pertinent skills may have been overlooked in the makeup of this survey. However,
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provisions have been made within the survey instrument to gather additional data not
specifically asked for.
Significance of Research
The information found in this study is intended to provide the Air Force with a
snapshot of how well communications and information systems officers are technically
prepared for deployment. The findings may prove to be significant in tailoring training
programs to meet the needs of today’s expeditionary Air Force.
Thesis Overview
This thesis is composed of five chapters: Chapter 1 provided a brief introduction
to the study. It outlined limited background information pertinent to the problem
addressed by the study. It also defined the scope of the study and addresses the
significance of the study as it relates to the 33S career field. This chapter also identified s
a series of guiding questions used to keep focused on the study’s purpose and provided
assumptions and limitations recognized by the author.
Chapter 2 provides background information through an extensive literature
review. The literature review attempts to explain the nature of the problem in a historical
context by exploring how the evolution of national security policy has shaped our
operating environment. It also summarizes how the Air Force has transformed to meet
the demands of today’s global security requirements while striving to maintain a
competitive advantage. Finally, this chapter reviews the current taxonomy used to train
33S officers for duty within the Expeditionary Air Force construct. This is done through
a review of current training opportunities for 33S officers made available from various
resources throughout the Air Force.
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Chapter 3, discusses in detail the methodology used for data collection, analysis,
and interpretation. Techniques and methods used for validating the studies results will
also be presented.
Chapter 4 presents data analysis derived from the application of the chosen
methodology. A detailed presentation of the survey results will be presented in an
aggregate descriptive form and some inferences will be made through statistical analysis
in an attempt to adequately answer the guiding research questions in chapter one.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a discussion of findings, presents conclusions to the
guiding research questions, and recommends future research opportunities.
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II. Literature Review

Evolution of National Security Policy
The destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989 unifying Germany symbolized the end
of the Cold War. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in which former Soviet
republics declared their independence from provided the United States with further
evidence that support for communism had diminished throughout Europe and the Eastern
block countries. Furthermore, it is widely accepted by political and military experts that
the collapse of the Soviet Union ended any real threat of global nuclear war between
superpowers (Woolf, 2006). In the course of a few years, the global environment had
changed from a world in which two predominant superpowers confronted each other to a
world in which only the United States remained supreme. While the presence of global
nuclear war has greatly diminished, it has been replaced by a host of regional and ethnic
conflicts. Nowak (1999) summed up the predictability of the Cold War era in his 1999
study where he stated:
“The Cold War era of 1946 to 1991 was actually one of relative calm.
During this period, nations found themselves divided into three basic
camps: those countries aligned with the “free world” ideals of the United
States, those aligned with the Soviet Union and its concept of world
socialism, and a smattering of non-aligned countries who attempted to
walk the tightrope between the two super powers. Within this framework
of ideologies, nations conducted international trade while the United
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States and Soviet Union jockeyed for hegemony over their respective
spheres of influence. “

Our national security policy of containment, first drafted during the Truman
administration and preserved largely intact through the Clinton administration, served the
country well for over half a century. During the Cold War, Americans faced the prospect
of instantaneous annihilation from a well known and well understood threat. The events
of September 11, 2001 on American soil confirmed a new threat has fully emerged, one
in which smaller but extremely damaging and unpredictable attacks, can occur anywhere,
anytime with little or no warning.
Contrary to predictions that the end of the Cold War would lead to a more stable
international political landscape, the end of the Cold War has produced much the
opposite. What remains in the wake of the Cold War are many regional areas of
instability characterized by fractured governments with social and economic unrest. The
end of the Cold War complicated world events to an unpredicted degree for U.S security
and foreign policy. Despite the terror of global nuclear war diminished, without an
adversary capable of directly threatening the security of the United States we continue to
struggle as a nation to find an adequate national security policy addressing the new
landscape; complicating the matter further, is attempting to define exactly what role the
military plays in such a policy. (Nowak, 1999)
With the events of September 11, 2001 the United States entered a noticeably
changed security environment. In the aftermath President George W. Bush set in motion
the stage for a radical redesign of national security policy. The Bush administration cast
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aside the principles of containment policy which characterized the Cold War era in search
for policy to restore security to a world that seemed suddenly more dangerous than ever.
The invasion of Afghanistan in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and subsequent overthrow of
the Taliban regime signaled the beginning of radical change in U.S. national security
policy (Tinsley, 2005). Following the invasion of Afghanistan President Bush announced
the foundation of our new national security policy in a speech given at West Point on
June 1, 2002 and again to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2002. In
these two addresses President Bush clearly and succinctly sums up the crux of the
administrations new policy in three sentences: “We will defend the peace against the
threats from terrorist and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations
among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open
societies on every continent” (Tinsley, 2005). The new policy, focused on global
engagement, has and will continue to have a dramatic affect on military operations for the
foreseeable future.
Impact of National Security Policy on Military Operations
I have heard the lament that, “the Air Force is not what it used to be during the
Cold War,” and I must tell you that it is absolutely true; this “ain’t” our fathers’
Air Force. As the world around us changes, so must all the services, including the
Air Force.
— General Michael E. Ryan
As the only remaining superpower following the Cold War foreign and domestic
pressure began to mount to reduce our military force; foreign countries no longer saw
need for U.S military presence on their soil and the American people historically have a
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disdain for financing a large military in times of peace. (Fisher, 1997) As a result, the
U.S. began a systematic process of reducing manning and eliminating overseas bases.
Figure.2-1 USAF Overseas Basing During the Cold War (Davis, 2003)

Air Force manning and our permanent presence overseas plummeted during the
1990s and into the 21st century, however, operations overseas continued on at various
levels of scope and intensity.
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Figure 2-2 USAF Overseas Basing Post Cold War (Davis 2003)

Military intervention around the world the past decade has ranged in size and
purpose from high intensity operations to low intensity humanitarian relief operations.
By virtue of being the only remaining superpower it is a virtual lock the United States
will remain engaged as a major player in the global environment through the foreseeable
future including at least the first half of the 21st century (Travnick, 2000). A RAND
Corporation study goes on to say:
“…‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW)...– lesser conflicts,
punitive raids and expeditions, peacekeeping, humanitarian operations,
and so forth – seem likely to remain a frequent feature of the world scene
through the first part of the 21st century…Humanitarian assistance will
remain a U.S. vocation…We do not see the demand for such aid
decreasing over the years to come. Indeed, it seems to us likely that the
number and severity of humanitarian crises will increase over the next 30
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years...the U.S. military will remain the organization best equipped to
respond to this menu of challenges” (Khalilzad,2003)

The last decade has been challenging to senior Air Force leaders in meeting
demands placed on troops and equipment. Our nation’s security strategy still dictated
that the Department of Defense be ready to fight and win two concurrent major theater
wars, while simultaneously remaining committed to an ever increasing series of small
scale contingencies. Despite the fact the Air Force lost two thirds of its permanent bases
in Europe and the Mediterranean during the 1990’s due to fiscal constraints the global
security environment in the early part of the 21st century dictates now more than ever the
Air Force have the flexibility and capability to respond rapidly and effectively to crises
anywhere in the world.
Speed and flexibility have long been tenets of war but not always complimentary
objectives. During the World War 1 era combat was characterized by large masses of
ground combat forces engaging on the battlefield. The tenet of speed in these situations
was achieved through strict adherence to very large and detailed battle plans; to deviate
from the predetermined amassing of forces was to jeopardize the entire operation. The
Air Force’s first attempt at implementing a rapid flexible response force was facilitated
by the organizations poor response to the outbreak of the Korean War; although the first
USAF combat sorties were actually flown within 24 hours of the U.S. government’s
decision to come to the aid of South Korea the best trained and equipped personnel from
Strategic Air Command did not enter the conflict until seven weeks after hostilities began
(Davis, 2003).
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Early attempts to meet the operational needs of a post Cold War environment
have met with limited success. One such attempt was spearheaded by former Air Force
Chief of Staff General Merril A. McPeak. General McPeak lead the Air Force through a
radical reorganization in the early 1990’s known as the “composite wing.” The
composite wing concept created combat units with all the assets needed to execute highly
complex combat tasks autonomously. All the assets were trained, operated, and
maintained at one base under the control of a single commander; this aspect of the
composite wing became known as one base/one wing/one boss solution (Bussiere, 2001).
General McPeak surmised the primary advantage of a composite wing would be its
potential for reducing the amount of higher-headquarters guidance and up-channel
reporting needed to prosecute daily combat operations. General McPeak cited other
distinct benefits including: 1) increased capability for independent action if the air tasking
link is interrupted; 2) enhanced ability to train in peacetime for expected combat
contingencies 3) reduced vulnerabilities resulting from the dispersal of critical assets; 4)
less pre-hostilities unit shuffling, i.e. taking one squadron from Base A and two
squadrons from Base B to form a combat unit and 5) consolidated command
responsibility in one individual, the wing commander (McPeak, 1990).
Proponents of the new structure hailed it as revolutionary and futuristic while
detractors insisted it was neither. History indeed shows that composite air organizations
in one form or another have existed as early as 1911 when the Signal Corps consolidated
two Wright Type-B and two Curtiss IV Model-D airplanes at Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
to explore their potential use in military applications (Moschgat, 1993). Composite units,
though rare have existed throughout the 20th century. Composite units were used post
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WWI to defend coastal areas of Hawaii and sustained themselves through the end of
WWII when the 509th Composite Group was used to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Later in the 1950’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) formed the Composite
Air Strike Force (CASF) which has been widely regarded as a precursor to General
McPeak’s composite wing concept. Although no longer labeled as composite wings
defacto composite organizations still exist in today’s Air Force (Moschgat, 1993).
Unquestionably the composite wing concept has many positive attributes. They
are flexible, responsive, and well suited for independent operations. With that said it still
did not meet the demands of post Cold War environment in which uncertainty is the norm
and quick response and flexibility are critical to achieving success on the battlefield.
Former USAF Chief of Staff General John Jumper stated that while composite wings
offered excellent training and operational opportunities for dissimilar aircraft, "it turned
out to be ungainly in its execution. In the day-to-day training, it was marvelous to have
all of those assets together, but it was offset by the ponderous way it got off the ground"
(Tirpak, 1997).
With composite wings proving not to be the answer, in order to meet the global
military demands of the 21st century the Air Force has transitioned in to a more mobile
organization under what is known as the Expeditionary Air Force construct, or EAF. The
EAF concept would later come to be known as the Air and Space Expeditionary Force
concept as the Air Force continues to incorporate space into its core competencies.
According to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-400, Aerospace Expeditionary Force
Planning, “The EAF concept is how the Air Force will organize, train, equip, deploy and
sustain itself by creating a mindset and cultural state that embraces the unique
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characteristics of aerospace power—range, speed, flexibility, precision—to meet the
national security challenges of the 21st Century. Former Secretary of the Air Force F.
Whitten Peters described the new EAF as “…not just one event. It is a completely
different way of looking at how we do our business. It is also a fundamental change in the
way we operate…. We are moving into the EAF for two reasons. First, to make sure that
the nation has the trained aerospace forces it needs. Second, to make sure that our people
have relief from operations tempo, or OPTEMPO, in a turbulent world.”
The origins of the EAF concept surfaced in October 1994, when Iraqi forces
under the control of dictator Saddam Hussein appeared to again be preparing for the
invasion of neighboring Kuwait. The United States had previously redeployed the vast
majority of its Operation Desert Storm assets back to its garrison locations and hence was
forced to rapidly return to the Persian Gulf with enough equipment and manpower to
prevent a reoccurrence of Iraq's 1990 invasion of the very small but strategically
important Arab state. The subsequent redeployment of forces on short notice proved to be
a major challenge for the Air Force. The answer was to create the Expeditionary
Aerospace Force, a new way of doing business that provided the Air Force with a potent
administrative tool to more proficiently align its resources with the needs of theater
commanders (Tirpak, 1997). EAF is a massive step forward from organizational
structures of the past but its foundation remains firmly planted in Air Force core
competencies of: air and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision
engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support (Fisher, 1997).
At the core of the Expeditionary Air Force is the Air Expeditionary Forces -- the
AEFs. Under the AEF concept almost all of the Air Force – active, Reserve and Guard --
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are divided into 10 equal fighting forces. The 10 AEFs are sourced by utilizing the preexisting USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) structure which identifies existing
USAF capabilities. Unique capabilities are listed in the WMP, Volume 3, Part 3 and are
uniquely identified by a 5 digit alpha-numeric Unit Type Code (UTC) designator. The
UTC contains three critical pieces of information: a mission capability statement which
describes the unique capability the UTC is intended to provide, manpower requirements
identified by AFSC, rank and skill levels required to perform the capability, and an
equipment listing identifying equipment needed to fulfill the capability. Table 2-1 shows
information typically found in a UTC Mission Capability Statement.
Table 2-1 UTC Mission Capability Statement and Manpower Detail Example
UTC: 6KNSC Title: COMM NETWORK OPS & SECURITY CTR
UNCLASSIFIED Mission Capability Statement: AUGMENTS UTC 6KNS1 TO EXPAND
AFFOR NOSC-D SERVICES. INCLUDES EXPERIENCED NOSC CREW COMMANDER,
ENTERPRISE CONTROLLERS, ENTERPRISE DEFENDERS, AND NOSC HELP DESK FOR
ONE SHIFT AT AFFOR NOSC-D.
MANPOWER DETAIL Authorized Total: 8 (Officers: 1 Enlisted: 7 Civilians:
0 Contractors: 0 Other: 0 )
AFSC
SEI
GRADE
QTY
LINE NUMBER
POSITION TITLE
COMM & INFORMATION
033S3
03
1
001
COM/COMPTR OPS JNMN
3C051
4
002
COM/COMPTR OPS CFMN
3C071
1
003
COM/CMPTR SYS-C JNMN
3C251
1
004
COM/CMPTR SY-C CFMN
3C271
1
005

The WMP, Vol 3, Part 3 lists all USAF UTCs currently approved and available to
theater commanders for operational planning and execution. The 10 AEFs are sourced as
equally as possible with a cross-section of UTCs from across the Air Force. Each AEF
package is designed to provide theater commanders with a full spectrum of Air Force
capabilities to respond within 72 hours of any unexpected contingency anywhere in the
world. The components are trained, equipped and capable of being tailored to meet
commanders' needs (AFI 10-403).
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AEFs were initially paired in packages of two with the first pair standing up Oct.
1, 1999 for a period of three months followed by twelve months on home station resulting
in a 15 month recurring cycle of deploy/reconstitute. The AEF force structure was
severely tested following the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil. The height of simultaneous
deployments supporting the Global War on Terrorism, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom
and Noble Eagle occurred in 2003. During this period nearly twice as many Airman
deployed during 2003 as during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. To meet the rising
demands of air and space power worldwide, the Air Force was forced to expand the AEF
Cycle from a 90-day, 15-month cycle to a 120-day, 20-month cycle, beginning Sept. 1,
2004 (USAF Fact Sheet, 2006).
Communication & Information Transformation
Why must organizations transform? The answer in its simplest form comes down
to two distinct factors: competitive advantage and economics. The Air Force describes
transformation as “A process by which the military achieves and maintains an advantage
through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or technologies…” (USAF
Transformation Flight Plan, 2004) while economics studies human behavior in the
context of allocating scarce resources. Not surprisingly, gaining and subsequently
maintaining competitive advantage in combat, as with any business venture, is a
continuous process. Competitive advantage is a constant desire and achieved
fundamentally through the effective allocation of resources. Allocating resources
however, is highly dependent on the scarcity of the resource. Scarcity of human resource
in the Air Force is as prevalent today as it has been at any time in its history; manning
strengths are at the lowest levels in the history of the Air Force.
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Figure 2-3 Personnel Strength 1948-2005 (Source: Airman –The Book, Winter 2006)

Reductions in force continue to be forecasted well into the early part of the next
decade and the Communications and Information career field are certainly not immune.
In 2006 approximately 4,300 33S officers were assigned to the career field (Airman,
2006). That number is projected to be reduced by 46% over the next five years to
roughly 2,350 by 2011. Today, C&I officers are responsible for roughly 35,000 enlisted
personnel, belonging to five core Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) and 19 different
technical specialties (Nelson, 2006). In addition, 33S officers are required to fill various
positions on 49 different UTCs identified in the USAF WMP, Vol 3, Part 3.
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Figure 2-4 Enlisted Specialties Under 33S Scope (Source: SAF/XCID Brief )
C&I Enlisted Specialties
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (3A)

COMM - ELECTRONICS - SYSTEMS (2E)
2E0X1

Ground Radar

2E1X1

Satellite, Wideband, Telemetry

2E1X2

Airfield Systems

2E1X3

Ground Radio

2E1X4

Visual Imagery & Intrusion Detect

2E2X1

Com, Network, Swg, Cypto Sys

2E6X2

Cable and Antenna Systems

2E6X3

Voice Network Systems

3A0X1

COMMUNICATIONS-COMPUTER
SYSTEMS (3C)
3C0X1

Operations

3C0X2

Programming

3C1X1

Radio Comm Systems

3C1X2

Electromagnetic Spectrum Mgmt

3C2X1

System Control

3C3X1

Planning and Implementation

POSTAL (8M)

VISUAL INFORMATION (3V)
3V0X1

Visual Information

3V0X2

Still Photographic

3V0X3

VI Production - Documentation

Information Management

8M000

Postal

The extreme diversity of the 33S career field poses a significant challenge to get
33S officers in the right place, at the right time, with the right skill sets.
Training 33S officers in the Expeditionary Air Force
A previous study conducted by Schmidt (1997), found interpersonal skills most
important to 33S officers followed by managerial skills then technical skills.
Figure 2-5 Skill Set Importance as Rated by 33S CGOs (Schmidt, 1997)
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The graph in Fig 2-5 depicts the average scores attained from a five point Likert scale.
The figures were compiled from a survey of administered to 242 33S company grade
officers. Phillips (1998) expanded on Schmidt’s research by administering a similar
survey to130 33S officers serving in designated commander duty positions. Phillips
found commanders also felt interpersonal skills were most important, followed by
managerial and technical skills.
Figure 2-6 Skill Set Importance as Rated by 33S CCs (Schmidt, 1997)

In addition to confirming Schmidt’s (1997) findings Phillips (1998) also identified
commanders felt technical skills were the skill set most lacking in their organizations.
Phillips’ finding is not surprising; it can be inferred less importance would be placed on
attaining technical skill sets given these skill sets were found to be of least importance.
Figure 2-7 Commanders Evaluation of 33S Skill Sets within their Organization
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The paradigm shift in national security policy to global engagement requires
rapid, flexible response anywhere, anytime; this will no doubt place increased emphasis
on preparedness. AEF missions will impose a variety of new demands. Thus, an
overriding issue concerns the substantial risk that current training will leave the Air Force
unprepared for future engagements (Fuchs, Vol 2, 1997). Developing technical expertise
in networking and mission system operations will prove invaluable in preparing to serve
in AFNOSC, MAJCOM NOSC, combined air operations center, Information Warfare
Flight, support battle staff, or survivable recovery center (33s CFETP. Apr 2006).
To prepare officers for duty the career field has developed a 33S Career Field
Education and Training Plan. This training plan serves as a roadmap for training C&I
officers. In addition, the CFETP outlines training communications officers should receive
to be effective and defines skills required to progress throughout their careers.
The first level of communications officer technical training has evolved over the
last decade in response to Air Force transformation. Basic Communications Officer
Training (BCOT) has transformed from an all inclusive 12 week, 9 block course of
instruction to a series of shorter courses tailored to specific duty positions within the
career field. The following is a summary of core technical training courses offered by
Air Education and Training Command (AETC) currently available to C&I officers:
- Expeditionary Communications Officer Training (ECOT) - provides a baseline
level of communications knowledge required for junior officers to function in the career
field. All 33S officers are required to attend this course prior to being awarded the 33S3
skill progression designator. The course combines technical instruction with concepts of
the Air Force’s vision, and introduces officers to the role of communications in the Air
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Force of today and tomorrow. In addition, the course provides an introduction to key
roles in communications squadrons, deployed communications, networking, enterprise
operations, information operations, executive officer duties, space operations and overall
view of war fighting integration. Table 2-2 shows the blocks of curriculum and the time
spent instructing each block to establish a baseline of knowledge for 33S officers.
Table 2-2 ECOT Curriculum
Course
Network Security Issues

Overview/Description
Duration
Security issues surrounding computers and 210 Minutes
the Internet

Telecommunications Essentials

Fundamentals of analog and digital
telephony

8.5 Hours

Networking Concepts

Basic networking concepts and devices

175 Minutes

Fundamentals of Internetworking

Topologies, protocols, and strategies of
networks

5 Hours

The Art of Knowledge Management

Big-picture information about knowledge-- 3.5 Hours
where it comes from and how to keep it
coming.

Strategic Planning and Positioning for New methods of strategic project planning 5 Hours
IT Projects
to help you plan more effectively for your
next IT project.
Strategic Management - Planning

The planning phase of strategic
management, which includes defining
company mission, performing internal
analysis, and evaluating the external
environment.

Introduction to Networking

The basic infrastructure of networks,
275 Minutes
including the client/server model and
network protocols, and the fundamentals of
Local Area Networks (LANs) and Wide
Area Networks (WANs)

LAN Topologies and Techniques

LAN topologies and access techniques

4 Hours

Network Security Overview

Fundamentals of security for defending
your network

185 Minutes

Introduction to IT Project
Management

Project management with a special focus
on managing IT projects.

4 Hours
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2.5 Hours

Components, Printers, Networks, and Functions of the motherboard, processors, 110 Minutes
Safety
and memory and to outline procedures for
maintenance, printer functionality, and
basic networking
Introduction to Communications
Methods and Equipment

Methods by which data is transferred
electronically from one device to another
and the hardware used to achieve this

200 Minutes

- Communications Officer Engineering Course - designed to further educate
officers in various aspects of engineering relative to the career field. Topics in this
course include engineering factors, communications link engineering and installation, and
network engineering and analysis.
- Communications Officer Deployed & Tactical Communications Education
Course - presents current and emerging communications programs, initiatives and
technologies impacting the Department of Defense total force concept for the
communications warriors in a deployed environment.
- Communications Officer Networking Training Course – provides the knowledge
and skills necessary to operate Air Force networks at the base/ wing level. It presents
current and emerging communications and information programs, initiatives and
technologies impacting the Department of Defense total force concept for the
communications manager in a fixed environment.
- Enterprise Network Operations – educates officers on roles, responsibilities, and
authority of agencies involved in the Air Force enterprise to include information
architecture, network operations and security, systems integration and capabilities, and
survivability & risk management in the full spectrum of operations.
- Communications Officer Warfighting Integration Education Course – provides
introduction to war fighting integration as it relates to command, control,
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communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
platforms.
- Advanced Communications Officer Training Course (ACOT) - professional
development school for intermediate-level C&I officers and civilian equivalents in the
33S career field. The course provides knowledge and skills necessary to perform duties
of Communications and Information Officer at the field grade level. Instruction is
provided in the areas of information operations, expeditionary warfare support,
communications squadron issues, and reflections on senior leader perspectives
(HQ AETC ETCA, 2007).
In addition to the core courses offered by AETC, the Air Force Communications
Agency (AFCA) is charged with providing supplemental training through the Officer
Technical Refresh (OTR) program. The program is designed to augment initial and
advanced communications training and fill the existing training gaps. The program
utilizes a regional training approach to minimize two major obstacles in obtaining
training: time and money. The program funds commercially available training and brings
it to regional sites with high concentrations of communications professionals. Courses
range from one day to five days (33S CFETP, 2006). The following table lists courses
currently available under the OTR program. Detailed descriptions of the below courses
are available through AFCA.
Table 2-3 Officer Technical Refresh Courses
Course Title

# of Days

Vender

650--Information Assurance, Roadmap to Excellence

4

AFCEA

351--Terrestrial and Wireless Networking and Trends

5

AFCEA

503--DoD Architecture Framework Implementation

5

AFCEA

504--Systems Engineering in a Net-Centric World

3

AFCEA
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(Formerly Advances in DoD Architecture)
601--From Data Mgt, Info Mgt, and Knowledge Mgt

3

AFCEA

4

AFCEA

5

AFCEA

3

AFCEA

281--Global Command and Control Net-Centric Family of Systems Leading to JC2

5

AFCEA

203--The U.S. Intelligence Community: Who Does What, With What, for What?

3

AFCEA

260--Data Mining Technologies and Their Applications to Counter-Terrorism

3

AFCEA

380--Covert Internet Communications

2

AFCEA

340--Automated High Frequency Radio

3

AFCEA

4

GlobalKnowledge

9800--Network Security I: Policy, Administration, and Firewalls

3

GlobalKnowledge

9860--Network Security II: Integration and Implementation

2

GlobalKnowledge

5

GlobalKnowledge

3285--Advanced Deployment of Voice Over IP

4

GlobalKnowledge

9805--Essentials of Network Security

5

GlobalKnowledge

5

GlobalKnowledge

4

Learning Tree

9452--Network Mgt--Tools, Optimization, and Troubleshooting

4

GlobalKnowledge

9100--Migrating to IPv6

3

GlobalKnowledge

2819--IT Project Management

3

GlobalKnowledge

2839--IT Risk Management

4

GlobalKnowledge

2805--Business Skills for IT Professionals

2

GlobalKnowledge

9856--Information Security in the Federal Government

2

GlobalKnowledge

2

GlobalKnowledge

1730--Storage Technology Foundations

5

GlobalKnowledge

461--Voice Over IP

4

Learning Tree

378--Mobile Communications and Wireless Networks

4

Learning Tree

488--Deploying Internet and Intranet Firewalls

4

Learning Tree

589--Assessing Network Vulnerabilities

4

Learning Tree

261--Net-Centric Warfare: Interpretation, Technologies and Implementation
(Formerly Introduction to Net-Centric Warfare)
302--Military Satellite Communications in a Net-Centric Transitional Communications World (Does not Travel)
350--Wireless Systems and Networks
(Formerly Local and Cellular Wireless Networks)

3760--Telecommunications Fundamentals
(Formerly Telecommunications Carrier Data Services)

3277--Voice over IP Foundations
(Formerly Implementing Voice Over IP)

3606--Wireless Networking I: Integration and Implementation
(Formerly Integrating Wireless Networks
3610--Wireless Networking II: Security and Analysis
(Formerly Securing Wireless Networks)

3681--Advanced Cellular Technologies
Formerly Next Generation Wireless Mobile Technology)
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536--Computer Forensics and Incident Response

4

Learning Tree

289--Disaster Recovery Planning

4

Learning Tree

241N--System and Network Security

4

Learning Tree

241R--Advances in Telecommunications

4

Learning Tree

371--Implementing and Troubleshooting Wi-Fi

5

Learning Tree

486--Implementing Web Security

4

Learning Tree

420--Securing wireless Networks: Hands-On

4

Learning Tree

468--Introduction to System and Network Security

4

Learning Tree

6515--Information Technology Project

3

American Mgt Assn

REQ111--Capabilities-Based Operational Requirements

3

AFIT

Several avenues exist for communications officers to further their knowledge of
the career field. AFCA hosts a series of C&I seminars with a target audience of Air
Force officers, senior NCOs and DAF civilians (GS-09 and above) that are performing
duties or about to assume responsibility for the operation of base-level communications
functions. Areas of instruction include: Information Management, Information
Protection, Maintenance Management, Information Systems Management, Planning and
Implementation Management, Project Planning. In addition, the opportunity for
computer based learning exists through the Air Force IT E-Learning web interface. This
interface provides numerous online courses to develop officer’s technical knowledge,
skills, and abilities.
Chapter Summary
This chapter provided background information through an extensive literature to
explain the nature of the problem in a historical context by exploring how the evolution
of national security policy has shaped our operating environment. In addition, it has
documented how the Air Force has transformed to meet the demands of today’s global
security requirements by evolving into a more rapid and responsive combat force through
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the implementation of the AEF construct. This chapter also reviewed the impact of
global engagement strategy on training and how the 33S career field has responded to
that demand. And finally, a review of the current taxonomy used to train 33S officers for
duty within the Expeditionary Air Force construct was included as well.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the methodology chosen to answer the guiding research
questions posed in Chapter 1. Again, the purpose of this survey is to identify how
important 33S officers feel technical skills are to succeeding in a deployed environment,
how technically prepared they feel to deploy, and finally, identify what technical skill
sets they feel are important to success in a deployed environment. Data gathered from a
descriptive survey will be used to answer the guiding questions. This chapter provides a
detailed explanation for the chosen methodology; relevancy of the population, data
collection methods, survey development and testing, sample size, and survey
administration.
Choosing a Methodology
Two overarching approaches to research methodology exist: qualitative and
quantitative. To select an appropriate research methodology Leedy and Ormrod (2005)
developed a framework of distinguishing characteristic of the two methodologies. This
framework was applied to the guiding research questions to select an appropriate
methodology. Leedy and Ormrod’s (2005) framework is based on five general questions
developed to assist the researcher in determining whether a qualitative, quantitative or
mixed method research approach should be utilized.
Table 3-1 Rationale for Selecting the Appropriate Research Methodology
Question:
What is the purpose of the research?

What is the nature of the research process?

Quantitative:
• To explain and predict
• To confirm and validate
• To test theory
• Focused
• Known variables
• Established guidelines

30

Qualitative:
• To describe and explain
• To explore and interpret
• To build theory
• Holistic
• Unknown variables
• Flexible guidelines

What are the data like and how are they
collected?
How are data analyzed

How are findings communicated?

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Static design
Context-free
Detached view
Numeric data
Representative, large sample
Standardized instruments
Statistical
Objective
Deductive reasoning
Numbers
Statistics, aggregated data
Formal voice, scientific style

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Emergent design
Context-bound
Personal view
Textual/Image based
Informative, small sample
Observations, interviews
Search for themes
Subjective
Inductive reasoning
Words
Narratives, individual quotes
Personal voice, literary style

(Leedy and Ormrod, 2005)

Question 1: What is the purpose of the research?
Leedy and Ormrod (2005) pose three sub-questions to help answer this:
1. Is the research intended to explain and predict or to describe and
explain?
2. Is the research intended to confirm and validate or to explore and
interpret?
3. Does the research attempt to test theory or to build theory?
Quantitative research attempts to explain by testing existing or proposed theory,
the qualitative research builds theory through exploration and interpretation of available
data. This research attempts to explain and predict by gathering new data, validate
findings through analysis, and challenge existing theory underlying technical skill
utilization in deployed environments.
Question 2: What is the nature of the research process?
Leedy and Ormrod’s (2005) second question also contains a number of subquestions:
1.

Is the research focused or holistic?

2.

Are the research variables known or unknown?

3.

Are research guidelines established and rigid, or are they flexible?
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4.

Is the research design static or emergent?

5.

Is the research process context free or context bound?

6.

Does the research process employ a detached view or a personal view?

This research is a focused effort on specific skills of a specific population, the
variables are well defined but limited in scope, research is contextually bound to a single
career field in a specific environment, and the research process employs a detached
objective view.
Question 3: What are the data like and how are they collected?
The third question concerns data collection methods. This study will examine
somewhat large representative sample of the relevant population using a standardized
survey instrument. The much of raw data gathered is not subject to interpretation but
quantitative in nature, however, a portion of the survey instrument gives respondents the
opportunity to provide feedback in an unstructured open ended question format. In
addition, qualitative information is gathered using a Likert scale which will be coded
numerically for quantitative analysis.
Question 4: What is the form of reasoning used in analysis?
The fourth question considered focuses on the form of reasoning or logic used in
conducting the research. This study is based on objectivity and statistical analysis.
Question 5: How are findings communicated?
Leedy and Ormrod’s (2005) final question explores how the researcher will
communicate his or her research results. This research effort incorporates numbers,
statistics and aggregated survey data. The findings will be communicated through
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descriptive and inferential statistical analysis in chapter four as well as a qualitative
evaluation of the findings in chapter five.
Appropriate Methodology
The elements of the study when compared to the research characteristics
identified by Leedy and Ormrod (2005) lean heavily towards quantitative methods.
However, some aspects of the survey instrument suggest that using a qualitative approach
is most appropriate. For this reason a mixed quantitative/qualitative methodology will be
utilized in conducting this research.
Data Collection Method
A survey instrument was chosen to collect data for this study. Conducting
surveys typically involves specifying a target variable(s) of interest, identifying a relevant
population displaying the variable of interest, deciding how best to gather the data and
developing an appropriate instrument, collecting the data, and finally synthesizing the
results in a comprehensive format (Thomas, 2003). Two primary reasons exist for
choosing this method. First, Communications and Information Systems officers are
dispersed across the globe. The career field transcends across the entire organizational
structure of the Air Force and Department of Defense. A questionnaire survey was
chosen due to time constraints and the ability to gather data effectively and efficiently
across a large geographically separated population. Second, survey instruments are
effective for measuring the current status of population’s characteristics and also provide
the ability to analyze, or possibly discover, relationships between variables of interest
using statistical analysis (Graziano, 1999).

33

Target Variables of Interest
The dependent variable, the variable subject to influence by independent
variables, for this research is the technical preparedness of 33S officers for duty in
deployed environments. Independent variables, those hypothesized to have an influence
on the dependent variable, included in this research include rank, deployed experience,
number of years as a 33S, type and amount of technical skills training received, and type
of formal education received.
Relevant Population
The study is designed to assess knowledge, skill, and ability requirements of 33S
Communication and Information Systems officers performing duties in deployed
environments; as such, the relevant population for this research is 33S officers with
current or previous deployed experience. The relevant population was extended to
include all 33S officers in any rank with any number of years experience in the 33S
career field who have served in deployed environments a minimum of one time. A
sample made up of various ranks and years of experience is appropriate for the following
reasons: 1) It is likely core technical knowledge, skill, and ability requirements will differ
across the rank spectrum. It is reasonable to expect a 16 year Lieutenant Colonel serving
as a deployed squadron commander will require different level of technical skill than a 6
year Captain deployed as a Mission Systems Flight commander 2) It is also likely
feelings of technical self efficacy will differ with rank and experience.
Sample Selection and External Validity
In most research it is not practical or even possible to sample the entire population
displaying the variable(s) of interest; in these situations the researcher must select a

34

subset, or sample, of the relevant population of interest. When sampling is used the
results of the study can be used to make inferences, or generalizations, of the entire
population if, and only if, the sample is truly representative of the entire population. If the
sample is truly representative of the population the research is considered to have
external validity (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). In most cases the ideal method for choosing a
representative sample is through probabilistic simple random sampling. Simple random
sampling is characterized by creating a sampling method that allows for each member of
a population of interest to have an equal chance of inclusion in the study. However, due
to various constraints most research does not have the luxury of pure random selection; in
these cases a non-probabilistic random sampling method is used (Schloss & Smith,
1999).
This study uses a non-probabilistic purposive method for random sample
selection; this sampling technique was selected on the basis of specialized knowledge and
experience inherent to the population of interest. The population of interest for this study
is a homogenous group of Air Force officers defined by a core set of technical skills
distinct to the communications and information career field. This baseline of technical
skill sets are largely unaffected by the unit or organization in which any one individual
may be assigned. In addition, with few exceptions, any 33S officer of the same rank is
just as likely to be subject to a particular deployment experience as the next. These two
factors combine to make any adequate sized sample of deployment experienced 33S
officers a true representative sample of the entire population of interest thereby providing
a high level of external validity to the research. In this case, the systematic sampling of
units containing large numbers of 33S officers regardless of MAJCOM or agency
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affiliation is the most efficient means of collecting data. However, the relevant
population in this study contains several distinct strata defined by rank. Each rank
appears in a significantly different proportion in relation to the relevant population as a
whole; for this reason a proportional stratified sampling would be ideal but will most
likely not be attained through voluntary participation.
Table 3-2 33S Career Field Stratification
Rank
# of Persons
2d Lt
385
1st Lt
624
Captain
1454
Major
866
Lieutenant Colonel 405
Colonel
119
Totals
3853
Source: HQ AFPC/DPAPDT, Jan 2007
Adequate sample size is another significant factor influencing external validity.
Statisticians have developed formulas for determining minimum sample size based on the
size of the population; however, the ability to meet this criterion is often constrained by
pragmatics and limited resources. As such, the basic rule in research is the larger the
sample size the better (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The following population proportion
formula provided by McClave, et.al (2005) was applied to find the minimum sample size
required:

Where

n=

(zα/2)2 (pq)
(SE)2

n
(zα/2)2
p
q
SE

= sample size required
= 90% confidence factor
= desired sample size factor
= (1-p)
= sampling error, equal to ½ the desired mean
confidence interval
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The value of (p) and (q) must be approximated to solve the equation. A desired sample
size factor of (.5) produces the largest product of (pq) and represents an overly
conservative large sample size. (zα/2)2 represents the distance between any given
measurement and mean of a population expressed in standard deviations and the desired
confidence interval is (.1). The following conservative minimum sample size is
recommended when applying the formula:

n

(1.645)2 (.5) (.5)
=
≈ 270
(.05)2

Participation in the study was completely voluntary and as such the minimum requisite
sample size was not met according to the formula provided by McClave, et.al (2005).
With that said, in general relatively small sample sizes can be used when other elements
of the study indicate reasonable power to suggest external validity (Schloss & Smith,
1999). In lieu of increasing sample size this study takes advantage of unique
characteristics inherent in the population to increase external validity. First, homogeny,
how alike or different the characteristics, of the population of interest is widely
recognized as a significant factor in determining an adequate sample size (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2005). In this case, as stated earlier, homogeny exists to a large degree in this
population of interest significantly reducing the need for an overwhelmingly large
sample. Second, this study takes advantage of what is known in statistic analysis as the
Central Limit Theorem. Central Limit Theorem states that when a sample is sufficiently
large enough, > 30 in most cases, the sample population takes on the characteristics of the
underlying population creating a normal distribution (McClave, et.al, 2005). These
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factors combine to make the obtained sample size adequate for generalization with
respect to the population of interest as a whole.
Survey Development
The survey instrument was developed utilizing previous research efforts
conducted by Schmidt (1997), Phillips (1998), and Little (1999). These previous efforts
focused on interpersonal, managerial, and technical skills in general. As such, the survey
instrument used in this research was modified significantly from the previous efforts to
meet the needs of a much narrower and more defined topic. In addition to the
aforementioned research efforts this survey is also comprised of a metric-based job
analysis questionnaire. The survey contains four primary areas: instruction and
disclosure; demographics; knowledge, skill, and ability assessment; and training and
education.
The survey opens with instructions and disclosure for the participants. This area
provided explanation of the purpose and intent of the survey as well as announcing that
participation is completely voluntary and that no responses of any kind will be attributed
to any individual choosing to participate. This part also provided instruction on how to
complete and submit the survey as well as contact information to ask questions if needed.
Finally, the opening section provides a definition for the term “technical” as it relates to
this research effort.
Section A of the survey was designed to capture demographic information of the
responders that are relevant to the research. Information gathered in this section includes
deployment experience, AFSC and skill level, and number of years experience as a
communications and information officer. This section also ask responders to rate the
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importance of how they feel having technical skills are to a successful deployment and
how technically well prepared they felt upon arrival in their most recent deployed
location. In addition, this section also attempts to gather which UTC the member
deployed under, what level of responsibility the responder had while deployed, what the
main mission of the deployed location was, and whether any specialized technical
training was required prior to the deployment. The information gathered in this section
was intended to be used to differentiate technical knowledge, skill, and ability
requirements by rank, level of responsibility, and deployed mission. It was also used to
assess deployment experienced 33S officers’ opinions on the importance of technical
knowledge and skill in deployed environments as well as the overall feeling of technical
preparedness in the career field.
Section B of the survey is a deployed technical knowledge, skills, and ability
requirements assessment. This section is comprised of 64 technical knowledge, skills,
and/or abilities (KSAs) classified into six core technical sub areas: network operations,
network infrastructure, information management, communications implementation and
planning, mission systems, and multimedia operations. The respondents are first asked to
identify one or more of the six core areas listed as their primary area(s) of responsibility
while deployed; they are also given the option to enter an area of responsibility not
included in the core six. The 64 technical KSAs are derived from 16 communications
Career Field Education and Training Plans (CFETP). Each KSA included in the survey
has been identified as a core task in at least one of the 16 CFETPs. The respondents are
instructed to identify which of the 64 KSAs listed he/she was required to use during their
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most recent deployment. Upon identifying a KSA as required the respondent is then
asked to answer three questions pertaining to that particular KSA; the three questions are:
1) How CRITICAL is having this knowledge or skill to accomplishing
the main mission of your job?
2) Did you have this knowledge prior to your deployment?
3) How did you acquire this knowledge?
The first question is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from minor to critical.
A Likert scale was chosen because of its particular usefulness to evaluate levels of
agreement or disagreement among individuals or groups when measuring qualitative
characteristics such as feelings and attitudes (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). In addition, the
Likert scale lends itself easily to conversion into numerical data for the expressed
purpose of statistical analysis (Thomas, 2003). The second and third questions are used
as complimentary measurements of preparedness. The second questions identifies if the
KSA was possessed prior to deployment thus indicating preparedness; the third question
identifies through what primary method the KSA was attained. The information gathered
in this section was intended to identify which KSAs are most important to succeeding in
a deployed environment and how the career field in general has acquired these skills.
Section C is designed to assess the education and training level of the career field.
The section asks if respondents hold technical degrees in the communications and
information systems fields of study. It also gathers information on how much and what
type of technical training has been received since being appointed a 33S officer. The
information in this section is designed to analyze the impact of technical degrees and
technical training on overall feelings of preparedness.
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Survey Testing and Internal Validity
The extent to which accurate conclusions can be drawn from the data collected
and analyzed in a particular research effort refers to internal validity of the research.
Internal validity is of highest concern when conducting experimental research specifically
designed to determine cause and effect relationships among variables (Leedy & Ormrod,
2005). This study is not experimental cause/effect research; however, internal validity is
important in all research to some degree.
The primary threat to internal validity in this study is questionnaire/survey design;
as such, extensive review among several parties was conducted to reduce internal threat.
First, the survey was designed by the author with input from several 33S officers with
both deployed communications experience and post- graduate research education. The
survey was then submitted to HQ ACC/A6 Readiness Branch for review and input.
Finally, the survey instrument was submitted to two 33S AFIT faculty and one civilian
PhD faculty member for review and approval. Several iterations of the survey were
required prior to approval. Upon approval the survey instrument was tested by
distributing to thirteen 33S AFIT students for validation before actual release to the
sample population.
Reducing Error
All human research assumes subjects exhibit characteristics that can be observed
and measured in some capacity; it also assumes that all means of measurement contain
some degree of error resulting from uncontrolled or unrecognized variability in the
measurement therefore an attempt must be made to minimize possible sources of error
(Schloss & Smith, 1999).
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Actions have been taken to reduce the two most likely sources of error in this
study: observation and procedural errors. First, observation errors are likely to increase
when the scope of observation is excessively broad. It is recommended that survey
instruments be designed to assess few overarching concepts with several measurement
items within each concept as opposed to several concepts with few measurement items
for each concept (Schloss & Smith, 1999). To combat observation errors the survey was
limited to six core 33S general knowledge, skill and ability areas as identified in the 33S
CFEPT. Each general area is comprised of a minimum of five (Information
Management) and a maximum of twenty (Network Operations) individual measurement
items with a mean of eleven.
Procedural error can occur from the inconsistent administration, recording,
scoring, and interpretation of responses. Procedural error is reduced by strict adherence
to a set of objective administration procedures (Schloss & Smith, 1999). Several steps
have been taken to minimize procedural error. First, comprehensive instructions were
incorporated into the survey to ensure standard responses. Written instruction was
provided at the beginning of the survey instrument for completion and submission of the
instrument and the KSA assessment portion provided detailed response instructions in the
headings of each page. Contact information was provided to give respondents an
opportunity to ask questions concerning completion/clarification of the instrument. In
addition, submission of completed surveys was automated to ensure consistent accurate
submission upon completion of the survey. Finally, responses were received and stored
as electronic data files to preserve the integrity of the respondent’s data. The stored data
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files were automatically imported into statistical analysis software eliminating the
possibility of human error in transcribing responses.
Survey Administration and Collection
The survey, along with a memo identifying the research effort’s sponsor and
elaborating on the study’s purpose, was electronically distributed to 36 commanders of
various communications organizations across the Air Force. Several organizations
chosen were selected for their high concentration of 33S authorizations as identified in
AFPC’s Assignment Management System and other organizations were chosen to
provide a broad sample across functional areas and Major Commands. The decision to
allow participation in the study was at the sole discretion of the respective unit
commanders; this was clearly stated in the request for participation sent to unit
commanders. The survey request allowed 15 days for completing and returning the
questionnaire. The survey responses were collected via email response in the form of an
.xml data file. The .xml data files were sequentially numbered and saved on electronic
storage media as they were received.
Data Analysis Procedures
Stored survey data files were first imported into Microsoft Excel for compilation
into a readable aggregate format; Likert scale responses were automatically coded into
numerical interval data for the purpose of statistical analysis. The summary of data was
then analyzed various ways to answer the guiding research questions from Chapter 1.
First, demographic information of respondents was presented in a descriptive
manner (i.e. rank, time in career field, deployed experience, etc…) and presented in table
format. Next, mean scores were computed from Section A of the survey instrument,
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questions 7 and 8, to answer guiding research questions 1 and 2. Finally, the 64 KSAs
were tabulated and analyzed to identify which skills are used in deployed environments
and means were computed to identify the level of importance of individual KSAs. The
KSAs were then grouped into to the six core categories and means were computed for the
each category. The categories were then analyzed using analysis of variance and
statistical pair-wise comparison to identify significant differences. Primary training
source data was also gathered; frequency tabulation was used to identify how 33S
officers are primarily gaining the necessary KSAs to succeed in deployed environments.
In answering the original guiding research questions several opportunities arose
during data analysis to test inferences, in the form of null and alternative hypotheses,
about the population of interest. The inferences were tested using statistical analysis for
the purpose of supporting external validity; the detailed results are presented Chapter 4.
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IV. Data Analysis
Overview
This chapter begins by summarizing data using detailed descriptive statistics of
the survey results and concludes with statistic analysis to test the inferences made in the
hypotheses below. Again, the purpose of this survey is to identify how important 33S
officers feel technical knowledge, skills, and abilities are to succeeding in a deployed
environment, how technically prepared they feel to deploy, and finally, identify what
technical skill sets they feel are important to success in a deployed environment. In
answering the original guiding research questions opportunities arose during data analysis
to make inferences about the population of interest. The inferences were formed into null
hypotheses (what is believed to be true) about the population and tested against
alternative hypotheses. Null and alternative hypotheses are represented by H0x and Hax
respectively. The following is a summary of the original guiding research questions and
hypotheses relating to the respective guiding questions:
Research Question 1 – Are C&I officers technically prepared for deployments in
forward operating locations?
H01 – C&I officers are adequately prepared technically for duty in
deployed environments.
Ha1 – C&I officers are less than adequately prepared technically for duty
in deployed environments
H02 – Technical degrees do not significantly increase technical
preparedness for 33S officers
Ha2 – Technical degrees do significantly increase technical preparedness
for 33S officers
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Research Question 2 – To what extent are technical knowledge, skills, and
abilities (KSAs) necessary for C&I officers to succeed in a deployed environment?
H03 – Technical KSAs are a significant need in deployed environments
Ha3 – Technical KSAs are less than a significant need in deployed
environments
H04 – Necessity for technical KSAs are the same for executive officer
deployments than for other 33S deployments
Ha4 – Necessity for technical KSAs are different for executive officer
deployments than for other 33S deployments
Research Question 3 – What technical knowledge, skills, and abilities are most
important in succeeding as a C&I officer in a deployed environment?
H05 – Significant differences do not exist in the criticality of technical
KSAs of at least one of the six core technical knowledge areas
Ha5 – Significant differences do exist in the criticality of technical KSAs
in at least on of the six core technical knowledge areas
Response Summary
The survey instrument was solicited to 36 C & I unit commanders across the Air
Force. The choice to allow unit participation in the study was at the sole discretion of the
respective unit commanders; in addition, individual participation in the study was
completely voluntary. As a result, the study includes one or more responses from 22 of
the 36 organizations originally solicited. 122 surveys were returned electronically via
email attachment. 44 respondents indicated they had not had any deployment experience
as a 33S and therefore their responses were of limited use; unless specifically addressed
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the rest of this analysis refers to deployment experienced respondents only. In addition,
one survey response was excluded due to inconsistent data; the respondent indicated
he/she had never been deployed as a 33S but continued the survey to identify KSAs
required during his/her last deployment. In the end, data from 77 deployment
experienced 33S officers were included for analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
The survey consisted of three sections: Section A, Demographics and Deployment
Experience; Section B, Deployed Knowledge, Skills, and Ability Requirements
Assessment; and Section C, Training and Education. The following is a purely
descriptive account of survey responses of each section:
Section A: Demographics and Deployment Experience
Rank: Approximately 36% of respondents hadn’t any deployment experience.
Just over half of the respondents held the rank of captain during their last deployment; 1st
and 2nd lieutenants were the next largest groups respectively followed by majors and
lieutenant colonels. Company grade officers made up approximately 84% of the
deployment experienced respondents in comparison to 16% for field grade officers. The
overwhelming proportion company grade respondents combined with the low
participation rate eliminates the possibility of making valid inferences concerning
differences between the two groups.
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Figure 4-1 Respondents by Rank
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33S Experience: Data captured pertains to respondents’ years experience as a 33S
officer only. No attempt was made to control for variables such as prior enlisted
experience or previous commissioned career field experience. It is recognized these
factors could significantly contribute to the sum of military experience but due to the
limited scope and specific purpose of this research would have no bearing on the outcome
and were thus excluded. Figure 4-2 shows 41% of respondents with less than two years,
48% with 2-4yrs, 67% with 4-8yrs, and 83% with greater than 8yrs have had 33S
deployment experience.
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Figure 4-2 33Sx Yrs Experience
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In addition, Table 4-1 shows a breakdown of respondent AFSCs. The vast majority of
respondents held the 33S3 AFSC which was expected as this is the most common AFSC
among C&I officers.
Table 4-1 AFSC Breakdown
# of
% of
AFSC
Respondents Respondents
33S1
15
19.48%
33S3
47
61.04%
33S4
11
14.29%
Other
4
5.19%
TOTAL
77
100.00%
* Other AFSCs provided: 33S3A(engineer) and (3) C33S3(commander designator)

Level of Responsibility in Deployed Environments: Figure 4-3 graphically
depicts 10% of respondent’s most recent deployment entailed duty as a squadron
commander or equivalent, 29 % as a flight commander or equivalent, 18% as an
executive officer, 13% as a staff officer, and 23% in some other capacity. Field grade
officers predominantly deployed as squadron commanders or staff officers, however, 2 of
the 8 respondents deployed as squadron commander held the rank of captain. CGOs
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deployed responsibilities entailed a wide range of duties accounting for 20 of the 22
“Other” responses summarized in Table 4-2.

Figure 4-3 Level of Responsibility
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Table 4-2 Summary of Level of Responsibility “Other” Responses
Rank
2LT
2LT
2LT
2LT
2LT
2LT
2LT
1LT
1LT
1LT
1LT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
CAPT
MAJ
LT COL

Responsibility
Operations Officer
NCC Chief
Network Engineer
Planning and Engineering
Led a team of 5 contractors
NCC Chief
Deputy Flight Commander
Network OIC
Squadron-level Project Manager / Engineer
Project manager
AFNORTH CAOC CFP OIC
Information Security Officer
UTC - Team Leader
C-6 Watch Officer / Project Officer
Project manager
OIC, Information Management Division
deputy chief
Deputy Flt Commander
CFACC Info Assurance Officer
Help Desk OIC
Systems Watch Officer
Air Liaison Officer to JSOTF
Task Force Chief
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Deployment Experience: 66% of the respondents have had only one deployment
experience. 23% have 2 deployments, 4% with 3 deployments, and 6% with 4 or more
deployments. Noteworthy is the fact that 17 of 51 respondents with only one deployment
have been a 33S less than 4 years while only 23% have been in more than 8 years.
Figure 4-4 Deployed Experience
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Table 4-3 shows a summary of UTCs which respondents identified as having deployed
on. Only 24 responses had UTCs identified; of these, the 6KTxx grouping (theater
deployable communications elements) was the most commonly identified. 6KNX3
(individual tasking to provide staff support for C & I functions at a deployed location)
was the only other UTC listed more than once.
Table 4-3 Listing of UTCs Deployed Under
UTC s Deployed Under
6KLS1
6KTEB (2)
6KMJ7
6KTEC (2)
6KNX3 (5) 6KTED
6KNZ40
9AAGL
6KQA1
9AAGS
6KTDD (3) F66V1
6KTE1
K199G
6KTEA
XKNYA
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Figure 4-5 shows that 75% of respondents’ most recent deployments have
occurred in the past three years while 88 % has occurred in the past five years. Only 12%
(9 of 77) respondents reported their most recent deployment as being prior to 2003 with
only 4% (3 of 77) prior to 2000.
Figure 4-5 Year of Most Recent Deployment
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Table 4-4 shows primary missions of deployed locations where respondents have
deployed. Support bases and combat operations bases account for 70% of respondents’
deployed locations. Table 4-5 is a listing of comments explaining the 20 “Other”
responses.
Table 4-4 Primary Mission of Forward Operating Locations where 33S have Deployed
Base Operating Support
Province Reconstruction
Combat Operations
Host Nation Advisory
Other
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34
2
20
1
20

Table 4-5 Primary Mission of Forward Operating Locations where 33S have Deployed
(Other)
Initial Comm to support Asian Games
ISR for combat and combat support operations in AOR
CENTAF NOSC Support
OIF/OEF Theater Communications Support
Humanitarian Relief
AFNORTH CAOC
Expeditionary Intelligence
Coalition Nations Support
NATO Compliance Inspections
CENTCOM HQ J6 Staff
Communications Operations and Engineering
US CENTCOM HQ
CENTCOM HQ
Homeland Security, NOBLE EAGLE
Personal Security Liaison Officer for VP of Iraq
Staff officer (CFLCC C6 LNO)

13 respondents reported having to receive specialized technical training prior to their
most recent deployment. A summary of the training is provided in Table 4-6. It should
be noted that several of the specialized technical skills training listed, although important,
is not specific to the C & I career field. Also, one respondent identified having to attend
specialized training but failed to provide course(s) attended.
Table 4-6 Summary of Specialized Training Received Prior to Deployment

UTC_
Unknown
6KT??
Unknown
Unknown
6KT??
9AAGL
9AAGS
Unknown
K199G
Unknown
6KQA1
6KMJ7

Specialized Training Attended
Weapons training, Chemical Warfare training, and COMSEC training
Mobility School
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 and Exchange 2003 Server; DNS and TCP/IP
Network Management, HP Openview, CiscoWorks, Network layout and workings
Theater Deployable Communications Systems Planner Course
Expeditionary Combat Skills Training
Combat Skills Training
Combat convoy course
Weekly State Dept interaction / Passport Specific / Daily Host Nation interaction /
Weekly Embassy interaction
Executive Officer Course (Keesler AFB)
Radio Direction Finding (a little of spectrum analysis/EMI survey)
Combat Comm Readiness Skills Training
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Technical Preparedness to Deploy: Technical preparedness was measured on a
five-point Likert scale ranging from extremely well prepared to completely unprepared.
88% (68 of 77) respondents stated they were adequately prepared or better for
deployment. Only one respondent reported being completely unprepared for deployment
while ten reported being extremely well prepared; 100% of field grade officers reported
being adequately prepared or better.
Figure 4-6 Technical Preparedness for Duty in Deployed
Environments
35

32

30

26

Frequency

25
20
15
10

8

10
5

1

0
Extremely Well Prepared
Well Prepared

Adequately
Prepared

Lacking
Needed Skills

Completely
Unprepared

Necessity of Technical Skills in a Deployed Environment: Necessity of technical
skills was also measured on a five point Likert scale ranging from critical need to no
need. Figure 4-7 shows 100% of respondents feel at least a slight need for technical
skills in a deployed environment. 96% report technical skills as being moderate need or
higher with a significant need being the most common response at 58%. 91.6% (11 of
12) field grade officers rated technical skills as a moderate need or higher while 96.9%
(63 of 65) company grade officers did the same.
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Figure 4-7 Necessity of Technical Skills in Deployed
Environments
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Section B: Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities Requirements Assessment
Section B of the survey instrument was intended to identify technical KSAs most
needed in deployed environments. Figure 4-8 uses a histogram to visually depict mean
distribution of required KSAs. The five point Likert scale used to measure the criticality
of the KSA provided the following choices: minor, limited benefit, useful, necessary, and
critical. The responses were then numerically coded 1 (minor) through 5 (critical) to
derive a mean criticality value. The graph shows 84% ( 54 of 64) of KSAs rated in the
survey received a mean criticality rating between 2 (limited benefit) and 4 (necessary).
53% (34 of 64) received a mean rating between 2.75 and 3.25 indicating the KSAs are
useful in a deployed environment.
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Figure 4-8 Distribution of KSAs 1 - 64 Mean
Criticality Values
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Table 4-7 breaks the KSAs down into the six core general knowledge areas
identified in the survey. Network infrastructure and Network Operations received the
highest criticality mean scores. The mean number of respondents per KSA in core areas
was calculated by adding the total number of respondents for each KSA in a core area
and dividing by the total number of KSAs in each respective core area. Network
Operations and Network Infrastructure core areas had the highest mean number of
respondents identifying KSA as required; Multimedia and Information Management
received the lowest mean scores. In addition, Multi Media was also identified as the least
needed skill set in a deployed environment by virtue of the lowest number of respondents
per KSA .
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Table 4-7 Mean Criticality Values of Core KSA Areas

Number of
Mean Number of
Core Area
Individual
Total Number Responses per
Mean Critical Value
KSAs in Core Responses in KSA in Core
(1-No Need, 5 Critical
Core Area
Area
Core Area
Areas
Need)
20
Network Ops
1037
51.85
2.79
10
Network Inf
492
49.20
2.84
5
Info Mgmt
221
44.20
2.07
10
Multi Media
390
39.00
1.76
6
Comm P&I
298
49.67
2.71
13
Mission Systems
544
41.85
2.71
64
Totals
2982
46.59
2.56*
* This was calculated by averaging the critical value of the 64 individual KSAs. If you average the 6 core
group means as shown in the table you get a mean critical value of 2.48

In addition to identifying the required KSAs respondents were also asked whether
or not they possessed the requisite knowledge, skill, or ability prior to their deployment.
Of the 2982 core area responses, respondents claimed knowledge of the respective KSA
prior to deployment just 53% of the time. No prior knowledge was claimed 37% of the
time and the remaining 10% was not identified as either known or unknown prior to
deployment.
Furthermore, respondents were asked to identify their primary method of attaining
the requisite knowledge skill or ability. Three choices were given for answering this
question: On-the-Job Training (OJT), Technical Training (i.e. BCOT, OTR, etc…), or
Formal Education (i.e. undergraduate/graduate studies). Table 4-8 summarizes
respondent’s claims for primary method of obtaining required knowledge.
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Table 4-8 Primary Methods of Obtaining Requisite Knowledge, Skill or Ability
Core Area
Network Operations
Network Infrastructure
Information Management
Multimedia
Comm Planning and Implementation
Mission Systems

OJT
71.2%
50.4%
84.2%
87.1%
66.4%
74.9%

Tech Trng
15.6%
21.9%
15.8%
7.9%
32.7%
20.0%

Form Ed
13.2%
27.7%
0.0%
5.0%
0.9%
5.1%

Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

This section also included an open ended qualitative question soliciting additional
information regarding technical knowledge, skills, and abilities not specifically addressed
in the survey. A common theme of these responses centered on the need for quality
technical training and on the job experience prior to deployment. Basic Communications
Officer Training was addressed several times; the common theme of these comments
imply BCOT as a somewhat useful familiarization course that develops little or no
technical abilities in the officer corp. The responses varied widely in scope and are
presented in their entirety in Appendix C.
Section C: Education and Training
This section of the survey solicited information on the members training and
education experiences. Relevant training and education data was gathered in an attempt
to establish a correlation between technical preparedness and the type and quantity of
training and education received. Types of data gathered included whether or not the
member holds a communications related technical, attendance of basic and advanced
communications officer training, and the amount and type/source of additional technical
training received.
Technical Degrees: Table 4-9 indicates 66% of the respondents hold
communications related technical degrees while 34% do not.
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Table 4-9 Technical Degrees Held by Respondents
Technical Undergraduate or Graduate
Degree in a Communications Related Field
(i.e. Computer Science, Programming,
etc…)
Yes
No
No Response
51
26
0
66%
34%
0%

BCOT or Equivalent Attendance: Table 4-10 indicates 94% of the officers who
responded have attended some form of basic communications officer training. 4%
reported never having attended while 3% did not respond to this question.
Table 4-10 BCOT or Equivalent Attendance

Attended Basic Officer
Communications Training
Course or Equivalent
Yes No
No Response
72
3
2
94% 4%
3%

ACOT or Equivalent Attendance: Table 4-11 indicates only 23% of the officers
who responded have attended some form of advanced communications officer training.
4% reported never having attended while 3% did not respond to this question.
Table 4-11 ACOT or Equivalent Attendance

Attended Advanced Officer
Communications Training
Course or Equivalent
Yes
No
No Response
18
56
3
23% 73%
4%

Additional Technical Communications Course Attendance: Table 4-12 indicates
66% of the officers who responded have attended some form of additional technical
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based communications courses. 30% reported never having attended while 4% did not
respond to this question.
Table 4-12 Additional Technical Communications Course Attendance

Attended Additional Technical
Communications Courses
Yes
No
No Response
51
23
3
66%
30%
4%

Figure 4-9 is a histogram showing the distribution of technical courses attended. Of the
51 respondents who reported attending additional technical training courses 35% (18)
have attended 4 or more courses.

Figure 4-9 Technical Comm Courses Attended
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Communications Based CBT Courses Usage: Table 4-13 indicates 71% of the
officers who responded have taken communications technical based CBT courses. 16%
reported never having attended while 13% did not respond to this question.

60

Table 4-13 Communications Based CBT Courses Usage
Taken Computer Based
Technical Training Courses
Yes
No
No Response
55
12
10
71% 16%
13%

Figure 4-10 is a histogram showing the distribution of technical based CBT courses
taken. Of the 55 respondents who reported taking CBT courses to improve their
technical skills over 50% (28) have taken six or more courses.
Figure 4-10 Computer Based Training
Usage
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Inferential Statistics
The only way to be certain the data described in the previous section truly
represents the population of interest is to have surveyed the entire population of 33S
officers. This is generally not possible and certainly was not the case in this study. With
that said, this section takes data obtained from the sample population as described in
detail in the previous section and uses inferential statistical methods to test the
hypotheses posed at the beginning of this chapter.
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Hypothesis 1
H01 – C&I officers are adequately prepared technically for duty in deployed
environments.
Ha1 – C&I officers are less than adequately prepared technically for duty in
deployed environments
Recall that technical preparedness was measured on a five point Likert scale 1 being
unprepared and 5 being extremely well prepared. In this case, the null hypothesis
represents a value of 3.00. Alternatively H01 and Ha1 can be written as follows:
H01: µ ≥ 3.00
Ha1: µ < 3.00
This hypothesis was tested using a lower one-tail z-value test statistic with a reliability
factor of ά = .05. z-values measure the distance between the value of the sample mean
and the mean specified in the null hypothesis in terms of standard deviations; ά = .05
represents a z-value of -1.645 in a lower one-tail test.
The z-value test statistic is calculated using the following formula:

Where:

x-bar = sample mean
µ = mean specified in null hypothesis
s = sample standard deviation
n = number of respondents

Table 4-14 shows descriptive statistics of the sample population as it pertains to technical
preparedness for deployment.
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Table 4-14 Technical Preparedness Descriptive Statistics
Technical Preparedness
Mean
3.545454545
Standard Error
0.102172998
Median
4
Mode
4
Standard Deviation 0.896564416
Sample Variance
0.803827751
Kurtosis
-0.124068533
Skewness
-0.308585375
Range
4
Minimum
1
Maximum
5
Sum
273
Count
77

The z-value was calculated as follows:

The z-value of 5.343 is much larger than the reliability factor of -1.645 thus we must fail
to reject the null hypothesis and believe the true technical preparedness of 33S officers is
at least adequate for serving in deployed environments.
Hypothesis 2
H02 – Technical degrees do not significantly increase technical
preparedness for 33S officers
Ha2 – Technical degrees do significantly increase technical preparedness
for 33S officers
Alternatively H02 and Ha2 can be written as follows:
H02: (µ1 - µ2) = D0
Ha2: (µ1 - µ2) > D0
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Where:

µ1 = technical preparedness mean of respondents holding technical degree
µ2 = technical preparedness mean of respondents with no technical degree
D0 = null hypothesized difference in means, in this case D0 = 0

Using Microsoft Excel, Hypothesis 2 was conducted by randomly selecting twenty
technical preparedness responses from each sub group. The responses were then tested
using a small sample t-Test for comparison of population sample means with ά = .05; the
results are shown in Table 4-15.
Table 4-15 Microsoft Excel t-Test Comparing Two Sample Means
Mean
Variance
Observations
Pearson Correlation
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail

Technical Degree - Yes
Technical Degreee - No
3.75
3.45
0.723684211
0.471052632
20
20
0.202824144
0
19
1.3708103
0.093205718
1.729132792

Analysis of Table 4-15 warrants failing to reject the null hypothesis. A reliability factor
(alpha) of .05 produced a t- test statistic of 1.37 which is less than the critical t-statistic of
1.73. Also of interest is the one-tail p-value. The p-value represents the probability of
observing another test statistic that is the same or more contradictory to the null
hypothesis as the t-statistic produced from the original sample data. If the p-value is
larger the alpha used in the test you must fail to reject H0; in this case p-value 0.18 is
larger than the alpha .05.
Hypothesis 3
H03 – Technical KSAs are a significant need in deployed environments
Ha3 – Technical KSAs are less than a significant need in deployed environments
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Again, necessity of technical knowledge, skills, and abilities was measured on a five
point Likert scale with 1 being no need and 5 being a critical need. In this case, the null
hypothesis represents a significant need value of 4.00. Alternatively H03 and Ha3 can be
written as follows:
H03: µ ≥ 4.00
Ha3: µ < 4.00
As with Hypothesis 1, this hypothesis was tested using a lower one-tail z-value test
statistic with a reliability factor of ά = .05.
The z-value test statistic is calculated using the following formula:

Table 4-16 shows descriptive statistics of the sample population as it pertains to necessity
of technical knowledge, skills, and abilities in deployed environments.
Table 4-16 KSA Necessity Descriptive Statistics
KSA Necessity
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
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3.675325
0.074961
4
4
0.657779
0.432673
0.264119
-0.39565
3
2
5
283
77

Substituting information from Table 4-16 into the formula yields the following:

The -4.334 z-value derived from the sample data falls well left of the -1.645 lower bound
thus sufficient evidence exists to reject the null hypothesis. 33S officers do not believe
technical skills are a significant need in deployed environments. The test was run again
using a modified hypothesis:
H03: µ ≥3.5
Ha3: µ < 3.5
This produced a z-value of 2.334 causing a failure to reject the null. Thus the two results
indicate that the true population mean lies closer to significant need than moderate need
as measured in the survey.
Hypothesis 4
H04 – Necessity for technical KSAs are the same for executive officer
deployments than for other 33S deployments
Ha4 – Necessity for technical KSAs are different for executive officer
deployments than for other 33S deployments
Alternatively H04 and Ha4 can be written as follows:
H04: (µ1 - µ2) = D0
Ha4: (µ1 - µ2) > D0
Where:µ1 = mean number of KSAs identified as required by officers deployed in
duty positions other than executive officer
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µ2 = mean number of KSAs identified as required by officers deployed as
an executive officer
D0 = null hypothesized difference in means, in this case D0 = 0
Using Microsoft Excel, Hypothesis 4 was conducted by randomly selecting ten aggregate
KSA counts from each sub group. The responses were then tested using a small sample
t-Test for comparison of population sample means with ά = .1; and assuming unequal
variance. The results are shown in Table 4-17.
Table 4-17 t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances Exec Duty vs. Other Comm
Duties
Other Comm
Duty
Exec Duty
38.3968254 28.71428571
571.5012801 607.9120879
63
14
0
19
1.336397098
0.098602294
1.327728209

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail

Analysis of Table 4-17 allows for the rejection of the null hypothesis. An alpha of .1
produced a t- test statistic of 1.336 which is greater than the critical t-statistic of 1.32.
Also of interest is the one-tail p-value. If the p-value is smaller than the alpha used in the
test you must reject H0; in this case p-value 0.0986 is smaller than the alpha .1.
Hypothesis 5
H05 – Significant differences do not exist in the criticality of technical KSAs of at
least one of the six core technical knowledge areas
Ha5 – Significant differences do exist in the criticality of technical KSAs in at
least one of the six core technical knowledge areas
Alternatively H05 and Ha5 can be written as follows:
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H05: µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ4= µ5 = µ6
Ha5: (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6)

≠ (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6)

Hypothesis 5 was tested by first establishing individual mean critical values for each core
knowledge area for each survey respondent (see Appendix D). A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was conducted with and alpha of .05 using MINITAB statistical
software. The results are presented in Figure 4-11.
Figure 4-11
One-way ANOVA: Net Ops, Net Inf, Info Mgmt, Multi Media, Comm P&I, Mission
Sys
Source
Factor
Error
Total

DF
5
318
323

S = 1.052

Level
Net Ops
Net Inf
Info Mgmt
Multi Media
Comm P&I
Mission Sys

SS
48.46
351.91
400.38

MS
9.69
1.11

R-Sq = 12.10%

N
67
57
49
45
57
49

Mean
2.879
2.887
2.137
1.882
2.813
2.817

F
8.76

P
0.000

R-Sq(adj) = 10.72%

StDev
0.881
1.143
1.073
0.874
1.219
1.074

Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev
-+---------+---------+---------+-------(-----*-----)
(------*------)
(------*-------)
(-------*-------)
(------*------)
(------*-------)
-+---------+---------+---------+-------1.60
2.00
2.40
2.80

Pooled StDev = 1.052

The observed significance level of the ANOVA test resulted in a p-value = 0.000
providing sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Consequently it can be
concluded that mean criticality scores are significantly different among the six core
technical knowledge areas. However, the ANOVA does not necessarily tell what means
are significantly different without a ranking the means with some measure of reliability.
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Subsequently, a Paired t-Test with an alpha of .05 was conducted on each possible pair of
core knowledge area means. The resulting p-values are summarized in Table 4-18.
Table 4-18 P-Value Matrix From Paired t-Tests

Net Ops Net Inf
Net Ops
Net Inf

.837

Info Mgmt

Mission
Multi Media Comm P&I Systems

.000

.000

.728

.500

.001

.001

.803

.660

.146

.005

.001

.000

.000

Info Mgmt
Multi Media
Comm P&I

.059

Mission Systems

Recall that p-values less than the alpha level used in the test, in this case .05, result in a
rejection of the null. Analyzing Table 4-18 it can be determined the skill sets of
Information Management and Multi Media are significantly different than the other four
core skill sets in terms of how critical their need is to succeed in deployed environments.
The only paired comparison these two skill sets did not have an observed significant
difference was when paired against each other (p-value = .146).
Chapter Summary
This chapter began by summarizing survey data using detailed descriptive
statistics in the form of tables, charts, and graphs. The chapter concluded with statistic
analysis to test hypothesized statements of what is assumed to be true about the
population of interest against alternative truth statements.
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V. Conclusions
Overview
This chapter attempts to assimilate all the information gathered during the course
of this study and structure it into meaningful conclusions. This was done by answering
the guiding research questions provided in Chapter 1 using data and information
extracted throughout the course of this research. In addition, opportunities for future
research to further enhance our ability to operate in a deployed environment are provided.
Discussion
First, note that 75 % of the respondent’s most recent deployed experience has
been in 2005 or later; this significantly contributes to the utility of this study by capturing
data that is current in terms of required knowledge needed in deployed environments.
Second, the most valuable part of this study may be the additional comments
consolidated in Appendix C. Analysis of these comments shows a career field that is
extremely diverse in terms of breadth of responsibility. The merging of communications
career fields over the last decade or so has made it extremely difficult if not impossible to
hone in on a core set of technical skills for 33S officers. The following comments
extracted from Appendix C support this position:
-

There is very little that I have used and applied in the Air Force that has come
from a formal or deliberate training program, but rather through OJT or self study
while trying to tackle a given problem..

-

While technical training is important from a background standpoint, there is
simply too much technical stuff out there for one person to be proficient in
everything you will be hit with and in my case researching, learning just enough
and implementing was a standard routine.
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-

I was not technically prepared for my deployment…I deployed under a different
job than I had worked for the last year on active duty, so I had no experience

-

…broadening the career field…this makes it nearly impossible for one person to
be proficient across all areas of the career field. I felt technically unprepared for
this deployment but somehow managed to pick-up what I needed while in the hot
seat.

Picking up knowledge on the “hot seat” is effective training; however, prolonged use of
this proven technique jeopardizes mission accomplishment. Those of us responsible for
providing communications support, but more importantly the war fighter depending on
the systems we provide, can not continue to rely on OJT in forward operating locations as
our primary means gaining the requisite knowledge. Really the only answer to this
quandary is a clear concise description of the duty position, only then can we ensure
getting the right people in the right place with the right skill sets. Simple, effective
processes are needed for returning troops to provide quality feedback. AEF Functional
Managers sorely need this feedback to establish useful, experience oriented, line remarks
when filling taskings. Once clear KSA requirements are identified we can proceed
forward in establishing the best way to acquire these skills before we arrive in theater.
With that said, the following section is a abridgment of findings to this study’s
specific guiding research questions:
Research Question 1 – Are C&I officers technically prepared for deployments in
forward operating locations?
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Let me preface by stating the overwhelming majority of respondents in this study
were in the company grader officer ranks therefore no attempt was made to draw
comparison or distinction between CGOs and FGOs in terms of technical preparedness.
Statistical analysis supports the assumption that 33S officers are technically
prepared to deploy, at least to the level where they feel adequate in their ability to
succeed in a deployed environment. This conclusion is somewhat contradicted by the
fact that this research also identified that only 53% of the knowledge, skills, and abilities
identified as being required in deployed locations were actually possessed by the
individual prior to their deployments. However, of the ten most critical KSAs,
respondents reported having acquired these skills 70% of the time prior to deployment.

“Teaching is the only major occupation of man for which we have not yet
developed tools that make an average person capable of competence and performance”
Peter F. Drucker

Drucker’s quote above implies two things: 1) teachers cannot instill competence
and performance in students with instruction alone and 2) students simply cannot become
competent and perform well with out experience. The results of this study seem to
support Drucker’s position. For example, 94% of all respondents reported having
attended basic officer’s communication training. 66% report having attended one or more
advanced technical training courses, while 71% have completed computer based training
courses to improve technical skills. Despite all of the training attended 72% of all
required technical knowledge, skills, and abilities were reported as being primarily
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acquired through on-the-job training. This sentiment is further demonstrated in the
additional comments provided by respondents; the following is some excerpts from
additional comments assembled in Appendix C:
-

“I was technically prepared only because of OJT in my in-garrison job…”

-

“Of course, nothing beats practical experience. It's not reasonable to expect
someone to have exposure in every subject matter”

-

“While my formal training did briefly cover most of the concepts/items I
needed on my deployment, I truly learned the most while at my deployed
location using/being responsible for the equipment.”

With the restructuring of the baseline curriculum it appears the career field is
heading in the right direction to support the proper balance of technical education,
training, and experience for junior grade officers. ECOT is paired down to just the need
to know basics of comm which is probably where it should be. In supplementing ECOT,
plenty of opportunities exist for increasing technical skills. CBTs are freely available and
indication from this study is that they are being utilized. 71% of respondents report
having completed CBT courses and over 50% of them reported completing more than six.
Additional communications courses are being utilized frequently as well, however, the
distribution is skewed. The largest percentage of respondents (34%) reported not having
attended any supplemental technical training courses while the second largest percentage
(23%) reported having attended 4 or more. This distribution is indicative of the “haves”
and the “have not’s” syndrome. Whether this is due to proximity of the available
training, lack of funds, or other reasons is not known but it certainly needs remedied.
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Another noteworthy piece of information extracted from this study is the fact that
as a general rule possessing a communications related technical degree has no significant
impact on an individual’s technical preparedness. This assertion is supported through the
inferential statistical analysis of Hypothesis 2 (H02) in Chapter IV. However, it should
also be noted that the sample size used for comparison was small thus increasing the
potential for true differences to go unnoticed. Also, this is not meant to imply that
specific 33S billets do not benefit from formal technical education, just that the depth of
the skills acquired in formal education are not generally needed in deployed
environments.
In addition, there is no substitution for experience. With over 40% of 33S officers
with less than two years time in the field having already deployed it is imperative new
33S accessions get practical experience through realistic training and/or exercises as soon
as possible upon entering the career field. The best way to accomplish this is not
addressed in this study.
Research Question 2 – To what extent are technical knowledge, skills, and
abilities necessary for C&I officers to succeed in a deployed environment?
Previous studies conducted by Schmidt (1997), Phillips (1998), and Little (1999)
supported the relative importance of technical skills as being inferior to those of
interpersonal and managerial skill sets. Although not tested directly, this study shows
signs the skill set order of merit may be altered in deployed environments. Predicated on
the experience of previously deployed 33S officers this research supports the fact that
technical skills are a moderate to significant need in deployed environments with a mean
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critical value between 3.5 and 4.0 on a five-point Likert Scale. Several respondents’
additional comments also support this claim:
-

“My specific job required high level knowledge of Server software and
infrastructure devices. Understanding how network devices interacted in
order to create and identify good network configurations and be able to
explain it to others.”

-

“…if I didn't know both the physical infrastructure side (fiber/copper) and the
actual TCP/IP routing, I would have been delayed many times…”

-

“Broad technical understanding is required in the deployed environment
because the "book" answers simply do not cut it when deployed for the simple
reason that when things break or go wrong, you have to find another way to
continue comm support. If the comm CGO does not truly understand the
various comm systems, they cannot provide proper guidance/support to the
comm mission areas nor to the leadership who expect results in a deployed
environment without issues/questions.”

Also, Hypothesis 4 (H04) in Chapter IV tested the necessity of having communications
deployed as an executive officer as opposed to being deployed in other communications
duty positions. The result was a statistically significant difference in the mean number of
KSAs required for exec duty as opposed to other comm related duties. The p-value
indicated only a minor significance. However, again a small sample size was used
making it difficult to observe any difference; it is likely the difference will be amplified
with a large sample. This result supports the position that it takes no special 33S
knowledge, skills, or abilities to serve as an executive officer in deployed environments.
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Research Question 3 – What technical knowledge, skills, and abilities are most
important in succeeding as a C&I officer in a deployed environment?
This research concludes that significant differences exist in the core technical skill
sets required by 33S officers in deployed environments. Network Operations, Network
Infrastructure, Communications Planning and Implementation, and Mission Systems
were found to be significantly more important in deployed locations than the skill sets of
Information Management and Multi Media services. Furthermore, 5 of the top 10 most
critically needed skills as identified by this study fall under the Network Operations skill
set; two each belong to Mission Systems and Network Infrastructure and one to
Communications Planning & Implementation.
Table 5-1 Top 10 KSA Critical Mean Values
Primary Training
Source

Top 10 KSA Critical Mean Values

KSA Survey #

Core
Knowledge
Area
KSA Description

Mean
Critical
Value

Prior
Knowledge OJT

Tech
Trng Form Ed

Net Ops

Messaging System Operations
(DMS, Outlook, etc…)

3.50

82%

91%

6%

KSA_51

C&I

Perform Site Surveys

3.45

58%

10%

90%

0%

KSA_22

Net Inf

Principles of Bandwidth

3.35

71%

41%

30%

28%

KSAC_62

Mission Sys

Voice Network Systems
Hardware and Concepts

3.30

59%

84%

13%

3%

KSA_26

Net Inf

Configuring Network Devices
(e.g. Switches, Routers)

3.27

80%

51%

26%

23%

KSAC_4

Net Ops

Functions of Computer
Components

3.26

94%

57%

8%

35%

Net Ops

COMSEC Accounting Practices

3.18

69%

88%

12%

0%

KSA_57

Mission Sys

Ground Radio Communications
Hardware and Concepts

3.15

60%

82%

15%

3%

KSA_10

Net Ops

Processing COMSEC Materials

3.11

69%

88%

12%

0%

Net Ops

Base Inter/Intranet
Administration and Policies

3.08

59%

79%

21%

0%

KSA_2

KSA_9

KSAC_20
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4%

Meanwhile 8 of the 10 lowest ranked KSAs belong to the Multi Media core skill group;
only one KSA in this group had a critical mean value above 2.0, video teleconferencing.
Table 5-2 Bottom 10 KSA Critical Mean Values
Primary Training
Source

Bottom 10 KSA Critical Mean Values

KSA Survey #

Core
Knowledge
Area
KSA Description

Mean
Critical
Value

Prior
KnowledgeOJT

Tech
Trng Form Ed

Multi Media

Video Concepts and Hardware

1.73

30%

88%

8%

4%

KSACRIT_42

Multi Media

Maintenance and Storage of
Multimedia Products

1.66

38%

82%

9%

9%

KSACRIT_40

Multi Media

Graphic Design Concepts and
Hardware

1.63

39%

83%

8%

8%

KSACRIT_15

Net Ops

Application of Programming
Languages

1.61

66%

26%

12%

62%

Multi Media

Copyright and Reproduction
Practices and Policies

1.59

41%

83%

9%

9%

KSACRIT_41

Multi Media

Audio/Video Editing Practices
and Policies

1.58

38%

83%

9%

9%

KSACRIT_43

Multi Media

Inspection and Maintenance of
Multimedia Equipment

1.55

29%

90%

10%

0%

KSACRIT_38

Multi Media

Photography Concepts and
Hardware

1.53

29%

90%

5%

5%

Net Ops

Digital Numbering Concepts
(Binary, Hex, etc…)

1.52

73%

15%

24%

62%

Multi Media

Media Production Facility
Operations

1.45

32%

91%

9%

0%

KSACRIT_39

KSACRIT_44

KSACRIT_16
KSACRIT_45

Multi Media skill sets are virtually a non-existent need for 33S in deployed environments.
With the ever increasing emphasis on deployed operations one possibility for
improvement may be to realign the garrison Multimedia flights to areas of responsibility
more closely associated with their deployed mission. This would free up additional 33S’s
to be assigned to garrison missions more closely related to their deployed missions.
Also noteworthy is that of the top ten required KSAs only one, performing site
surveys, attributes technical training as its primary source of acquiring this knowledge.
This would suggest that technical training is not properly tailored to the needs of an
expeditionary environment.
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Another significant fact, two Network Operations KSAs, digital numbering
concepts and programming languages, have the highest percentage as citing formal
education as the primary source of acquiring this knowledge. These two skills also
happen to be rated in the bottom 10 KSAs in mean critical value; this would seem to
further supports H02 that there is not a significant difference in technical preparedness
between 33S with or without communications related technical degrees.
Recommendations for Further Research
41% of respondents in the sample population with less than two years experience have
already deployed. With that being the case, gaining realistic deployment experience for
new 33S officers as soon as possible upon entering the career field is vital. Further
research needs to be conducted on how to accomplish this in quality and cost effective
manner. Also, this study showed CBT usage of the sample population was fairly high. In
addition, those using them are using them heavily; almost 80% of those reported
completing 3 or more while over 50% complete 6 or more. Further research needs to be
conducted on measuring the efficacy this form of training has on technical preparedness
for deployment. This study revealed that multimedia skills and information management
skills are of relatively little importance in deployed environments. Research needs to be
conducted to ascertain the feasibility of realigning these services to areas of responsibility
more in line with their deployed mission. Finally, the extreme diversity in the career
field is a significant issue in terms of getting the right skills sets in the right locations.
Unfortunately this study did not contain enough data to significantly correlate KSAs to
specific UTCs. Further research needs to be conducted to better tailor skill sets to
specific UTCs, AORs, duty positions, etc….
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Final Thoughts
During the literature review for this study it became quite clear expeditionary
operations will remain a cornerstone of preserving peace and promoting democracy
throughout the world now and for the foreseeable future. Military operations in the past,
present, and future are highly dependant on the timely distribution of accurate
information; the only thing really changing is the speed and means in which it is
controlled, shared, and disseminated. As we proceed forward in the information age
technology and the men and women responsible for it will play an ever increasing role in
getting the right information in the right place at the right time. This study is important to
the Air Force in the sense that it attempts to quantify how well prepared 33S officers are
to do just that when and where it matters most.
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Appendix A: 33S Deployed Technical Knowledge, Skills, and Ability (KSA) Requirements Survey
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Appendix B: KSAs 1-64 Critical Mean Values
# of Times Selected = The number of respondents (maximum 77) who identified the
respective KSA as being at least of minor importance in their deployed environment.
Min = Minimum score received by at least one respondent on the five-point measurement
instrument.
Max = Maximum score received by at least one respondent on the five-point
measurement instrument.
Mean = Average score received on the five-point measurement instrument.

KSA Survey
#

Core
Knowledge
Area
KSA Description

KSA_1

Net Ops

KSA_2

Net Ops

Configure
Workstations/Printers
Messaging System
Operations (DMS, Outlook,
etc…)

KSA_3

Net Ops

KSA_4

Net Ops

KSA_5

Net Ops

KSA_6

Net Ops

KSA_7

Net Ops

# of Times
Selected
(Max 77) Min Max Mean
59 1

5

2.68

58 1

5

3.50

Networking Standards and
Protocols Concepts

58 1

5

2.93

Functions of Computer
Components

57 1

5

3.26

53 1

5

2.57

50 1

5

2.80

54 1

5

3.06

53 1

5

2.92

56 1

5

3.18

56 1

5

3.11

Equipment Control Officer
Responsibilities
Use Network
Administration Software
(Windows Active Directory,
SMS, etc…)
Security Patch
Implementation Software and
Policies

KSA_8

Net Ops

KSA_9

Net Ops

KSA_10

Net Ops

Network/Boundary
Protection Hardware, Software,
and Concepts
COMSEC Accounting
Practices
Processing COMSEC
Materials

KSA_11

Net Ops

Firewalls and Intrusion
Detection Systems and Concepts

52 1

5

3.04

KSA_12

Net Ops

System Certification and
Accreditation Process

54 1

5

2.76

KSA_13

Net Ops

Virtual Private Network
Concepts

48 1

5

2.52

KSA_14

Net Ops

File Server Configuration
and Management

50 1

5

2.94

Net Ops

Application of Programming
Languages

44 1

4

1.61

Net Ops

Digital Numbering Concepts
(Binary, Hex, etc…)

44 1

4

1.52

KSA_15
KSA_16

92

KSA Survey
#

Core
Knowledge
Area
KSA Description

# of Times
Selected
(Max 77) Min Max Mean

KSA_17

Net Ops

Administer User Accounts
(e.g. create, modify, delete,
etc…)

KSA_18

Net Ops

Network Data Back Up and
Recovery Systems and Concepts

48 1

5

2.92

Net Ops

Integrated Communications
Access Package Hardware and
Concepts

43 1

5

2.35

Net Ops

Base Inter/Intranet
Administration and Policies

51 1

5

3.08

53 1
54 1

5
5

3.08
3.35

KSA_19
KSA_20

Understanding of Network
Topologies

49 1

5

3.04

KSA_21
KSA_22

Net Inf
Net Inf

KSA_23

Net Inf

Understand Data Structures
(bits, bytes, packets, etc…)

49 1

5

2.51

KSA_24

Net Inf

Wireless Technology
Applications and Concepts

48 1

5

2.79

KSA_25

Net Inf

Evaluating Network
Performance

51 1

5

3.08

KSA_26

Net Inf

Configuring Network
Devices (e.g. Switches, Routers)

52 1

5

3.27

49 1
47 1
49 1

5
5
5

2.80
2.57
2.69

Net Inf

Integrated Communications
Access Package Hardware and
Concepts

40 1

5

2.30

KSA_31

Info Mgmt

Publications Management
Policies

44 1

5

2.07

KSA_32

Info Mgmt

Records Management
Principles

46 1

5

2.17

KSA_33

Info Mgmt

FOIA and Privacy Act
Management

44 1

5

2.25

Info Mgmt

Base Information Transfer
System Procedures

42 1

4

1.76

45 1
43 1

5
5

2.11
2.93

40 1

5

1.98

38 1

5

1.53

KSA_27
KSA_28
KSA_29
KSA_30

KSA_34

Net Inf
Net Inf
Net Inf

Principles of Bandwidth

Use Network Analysis
Tools (e.g. Cisco Works, HP
Openview, etc…)
Subnetting Concepts
TCP/IP Concepts

Postal Service Operations
and Management

KSA_35
KSA_36

Info Mgmt
Multi Media

KSA_37

Multi Media

KSA_38

Multi Media

KSA_39

Multi Media

Photography Concepts and
Hardware
Video Concepts and
Hardware

40 1

5

1.73

Multi Media

Graphic Design Concepts
and Hardware

38 1

5

1.63

Multi Media

Audio/Video Editing
Practices and Policies

38 1

5

1.58

KSA_40
KSA_41

Video Teleconferencing
Alert Photography
Principles/Policies
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KSA Survey
#

Core
Knowledge
Area
KSA Description

# of Times
Selected
(Max 77) Min Max Mean

Multi Media

Maintenance and Storage of
Multimedia Products

38 1

5

1.66

KSA_43

Multi Media

Inspection and Maintenance
of Multimedia Equipment

38 1

5

1.55

KSA_44

Multi Media

Copyright and Reproduction
Practices and Policies

39 1

5

1.59

KSA_45
KSA_46

Multi Media
Comm P&I

38 1
49 1

4
5

1.45
2.67

KSA_47

Comm P&I

C4ISR Infrastructure
Planning Systems (CIPS)

47 1

5

2.40

KSA_48

Comm P&I

Project Management
Documentation, Policies and
Procedures

47 1

5

2.68

KSA_49

Comm P&I

Funded/Unfunded
Requirements Process

51 1

5

2.47

KSA_50
KSA_51

Comm P&I
Comm P&I

Perform Site Surveys

51 1
53 1

5
5

2.61
3.45

KSA_52

Mission Sys

Maintenance Management
Processes

41 1

5

2.93

Mission Sys

Personal Wireless
Communications Hardware and
Concepts

42 1

5

2.64

KSA_54

Mission Sys

Ground Radar Systems
Hardware and Concepts

41 1

5

2.49

KSA_55

Mission Sys

Satellite Access Requests
Policy and Procedures

41 1

5

2.78

KSA_56

Mission Sys

46 1

5

2.96

KSA_57

Mission Sys

Frequency Spectrum
Management
Ground Radio
Communications Hardware and
Concepts

46 1

5

3.15

Mission Sys

Cable and Antenna Systems
Hardware and Concepts

46 1

5

3.02

KSA_59

Mission Sys

Satellite Wideband
Telemetry Systems Hardware
and Concepts

43 1

5

2.77

KSA_60

Mission Sys

Visual Imagery and
Intrusion Detection Systems

35 1

5

1.83

Mission Sys

ATCALS Hardware and
Concepts

38 1

5

2.21

Mission Sys

Voice Network Systems
Hardware and Concepts

43 1

5

3.30

Mission Sys

Integrated Communications
Access Package Hardware and
Concepts

39 1

5

2.33

Mission Sys

Basic Electronic Principles
(e.g. opens, shorts, modulation,
etc…)

43 1

5

2.79

KSA_42

KSA_53

KSA_58

KSA_61
KSA_62
KSA_63
KSA_64

Media Production Facility
Operations
DoD Architecture Standards

System Certification and
Accreditation Process
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Appendix C: Survey Section B, Question 2, Additional Comments

Survey Response Number Section B_Question 2_KSA Additional Comments
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data65.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data83.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data38.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data20.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data43.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data80.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data122.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data58.xml

I was extremely lucky to have SNCOs and NCOs that were very qualified and
willing to teach me the information needed to execute me duties as Flight
Commander, Mission Systems and SATCOM.
While my formal training did briefly cover most of the concepts/items I
needed on my deployment, I truly learned the most while at my deployed
location using/being responsible for the equipment. Since Comm is such a
diverse field to be into, I realize there's no easy way to cover it all in formal
training and like how as a Comm Officer most of my training takes place at
my unit "on the job." This helps keep me flexible and enables me to quickly
adapt to an ever changing environment. My Combat Comm experiences
were immensely useful on my deployment as I was already familiar with: the
TPN-19, the TACAN, radios, and combat/safety training in hazardous
environments. The areas that I wasn't so familiar with were telephone/data
infrastructure, maintenance reporting, and quality assurance.
I had about 4-5 months experience as an Executive Officer prior to being
deployed and that was what prepared me to best. Although there were many
things I had to learn OJT (i.e. you do whatever is necessary for the
mission/boss to be successful). I didn't need a lot of technical skills to
function but when I did I had the experts who deployed to do those functions
assist.
I believe all comm. officers before an assignment should take a supplemental
course especially such units as Combat Communications Units.
I was not technically prepared for my deployment. I didn't learn any of the
knowledge I needed before I entered active duty or in any of my
schools/training. I deployed under a different job than I had worked for the
last year on active duty, so I had no experience.
My specific job required high level knowledge of Server software and
infrastructure devices. Understanding how network devices interacted in
order to create and identify good network configurations and be able to
explain it to others. Most of my training was accomplished through
commercial training, but some was done through in-house classes at the
AFCA. I also received OJT from our contractors. From interacting with other
officers while deployed, it is important that they know what each piece of
equipment does (not necessarily how it works) in order to adequately
manage their team. Many did not know what was going on with their
network. "Know just enough to be dangerous."
The tasks I encountered while I was deployed were very straight forward and
when looked at logically were easy to find solutions for.
I deployed before attending BCOT, so I was not prepared at all for any of the
responsibilities I would face. However, deployment provided an excellent
OJT environment with a lack of bureaucracy to impede me from learning
what I wanted to learn about the systems I was responsible for. When I
finally did attend BCOT, it was a survey course at best which introduced us
as new students to the vocabulary of the Air Force and the C&I world, but
without actually teaching us anything about the processes and principles
involved in making the C&I world function. I have not used any skills or
knowledge gained from BCOT in any of my jobs.
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Survey Response Number Section B_Question 2_KSA Additional Comments
A realistic description of required skills BEFORE deployment would have
helped. I learned how to configure a "green box" KG-600 or something, but
Deployed Requirements
only cadre needed this skill. I should have learned advanced Exchange
Server techniques.
Survey_data60.xml
Physical and transport layers of the stack! Even in the plans shop, if I didn't
know both the physical infrastructure side (fiber/copper) and the actual
Deployed Requirements
TCP/IP routing, I would have been delayed many times as technicians stalled
out.
Survey_data33.xml
Tech prep included site visit before deployment to Beale AFB for a few days
for tech orientation to the mission I was supporting. Insight into structure of
TPED (transmission, processing, exploitation, dissemination) intelligence
data was essential to my ability to command the unit and make critical
decision affecting site mission readiness. E.g., some repairs were not
exactly per T.O., but saved 2 weeks downtime and provided mission
continuance. I did not need to fully understand the tech aspects of the
Deployed Requirements
mission, but the ability to do so aided in my decision-making processes as
site commander.
Survey_data106.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data4.xml

We built a bare base in three weeks. Understanding the mission
requirements was key to overwhelming success. Relation of the mission to
our capability is what the war-fighter wants.
As a comm planner you have to understand how ECES does business as
well. Understanding their processes makes your job a lot easier.
Contracting knowledge is also critical. Many of our new programs are
installed via DoD contractors.

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data28.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data102.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data103.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data110.xml

Network design...critical to ensuring you are making the best decisions that
provide for future expansion of base mission.
Having a sound understanding of the technical principles key to operations is
important as there is little time to get familiar on an issue once deployed. Of
course, nothing beats practical experience. It's not reasonable to expect
someone to have exposure in every subject matter but a broad base of
knowledge is necessary.
I feel what prepared me most for my deployment was my Engineering
Installation (E&I) background.
I was technically prepared only because of OJT in my in-garrison job I
received from actively seeking out the information to lead a bare base
communications infrastructure set up. BCOT gave me ZERO skills, and I
gained some basic knowledge from the TDC/ICAP Systems Planner Course
(good for basic foundation). If I had not been in an in-garrison job leading a
Deployable Communication Flight, with ready access and training on
deployable comm systems, I would have been ill-prepared and a hindrance
to mission accomplishment. Luckily I was able to learn the necessary skills
by OJT and trial-and-error by leading my Deployable Comm Flight while ingarrison prior to our multiple deployments. Broad technical understanding is
required in the deployed environment because the "book" answers simply do
not cut it when deployed for the simple reason that when things break or go
wrong, you have to find another way to continue comm support. If the comm
CGO does not truly understand the various comm systems, they cannot
provide proper guidance/support to the comm mission areas nor to the
leadership who expect results in a deployed environment without
issues/questions.
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Survey Response Number Section B_Question 2_KSA Additional Comments
Need to have info on following areas prior to deploying in SCM: CA/CRL
Deployed Requirements
accounts, IMDS, LMRs, Giant Voice, TSSRs, AFN, UPS, Generators, ECUs,
Survey_data86.xml
telephone switches, copper/fiber.
- Microsoft FrontPage training to manage webpage design and maintenance.
CENTCOM provided an introductory course after arriving on station. I had a
basic knowledge of the software from personal experiences, no formal
Deployed Requirements
training.
Survey_data48.xml
- Microsoft Access database
AF made two critical mistakes in the 90s: making officers generalists instead
of specialists and broadening the career field. This makes it nearly
impossible for one person to be proficient across all areas of the career field.
I felt technically unprepared for this deployment but somehow managed to
pick-up what I needed while in the hot seat. This is a terrible position to put
our troops in and an even worse condition to force on the deployed units who
Deployed Requirements
depend on us. I think the AF is doing a better job with pre-deployment
Survey_data88.xml
training, but it was non-existent at that time.
Being deployed to CENTCOM HQ (summer '06), it was extremely important
to understand the terminology of Joint/Combined Forces Commands.
Working with the other services was much easier knowing this information.
This information is easily attained (from a knowledge perspective) in the
Warfighting Integration course at Keesler AFB and the AOC Fundamentals
course at Hurlburt Field.I was technically prepared for this deployment due to
my prior duties as an Instructor at Keesler. I had already taught a multitude
of the information that was needed for my deployment.I was also deployed to
PSAB, Saudi Arabia (summer '02) as a Comm Plans officer. This was prior
to the knowledge I attained as an instructor. It was an extremely difficult
deployment due to the limited knowledge I had as a brand new Capt with
Deployed Requirements
very limited deployed comm knowledge. The survey results above are solely
Survey_data91.xml
on the summer '06 deployment.
Command structure differences; I had just left Central Command so I was
very familiar with the AOR. If I had not had the Central Command
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data69.xml
background I would have been a little lost.
Deployed Requirements
RF engineering, evaluating radio networks, and structural engineering were
Survey_data45.xml
pertinent skills that I wish I had more practice with prior to the deployment
The majority of my deployment was spent as a Work Group Manager for the
CENCOM Coalition Village. Where I would set up computers, email
accounts, and other communication devices for the 300 Coalition officers. It
required in-depth knowledge of computer systems and the workings of
Microsoft Outlook. The position could easily have been better filled with a
trained E-4 or E-5. However, because of the cultural aspect of some
coalition countries, it required an O-3 or O-4 to deal with the dignitaries.
80% of the knowledge required for this position I have obtained from working
with my own computers systems at home. The other 20% I had picked up
from the WGMs at my home station.

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data6.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data34.xml

I did deploy to Qatar for 35 days as the Forward CENTCOM HQ as the
Coalition Coordination Center representative. There I tracked the 35K
coalition troop in OEF, OIF, and Horn of Africa for the CENTCOM CC. The
skills necessary to fill this Staff Officer position was gain on the fly with lots of
help for the other officers performing similar duties.
Knowledge of deployed systems/interfacing, some electronics background
helpful, waveforms, signaling,
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Survey Response Number Section B_Question 2_KSA Additional Comments
As an executive officer, courses on writing, time management and
organization would have prepared me more than the stuff I learned in BCOT.
While BCOT was a very interesting course, I have yet to actually use any of
it. I acquired most of the skills I needed as an executive officer by actually
being an executive officer for the maintenance group at my base. I knew
what skills were needed, understood the AFIs that applied to the job and was
Deployed Requirements
organized properly because I had already gone through the pain of learning
Survey_data35.xml
the job the hard way.
Executive Officers need to have good understanding of MS Office Suite
products (i.e., Outlook, Word, Power Point, Publisher, etc.). It's also
beneficial if they've worked Protocol before and have dealt with
Communication Planning and Implementation (oftentimes, they coordinate
finance issues with Contracting and have dialog with Civil Engineering on a
daily basis). Moreover, I've submitted form 3215s to order various comm
items (i.e., Iridiums/Satellite phones). I've also had to manage the OPSEC
program, Vehicle Control and Transportation Management Office
responsibilities. Occasionally, I've coordinated VTCs and site addresses;
Deployed Requirements
along with, Voice Over SIPRNET phones and call manager configuration.
Survey_data32.xml
Communications Officers need to have a clear understanding of wide
spectrum of real-world communications issues (especially in the deployed
environment) and a working knowledge of basic and advanced
communications means. I was prior enlisted (2E2X1) and this gave me the
background I needed but, some young officer may not be as prepared as we
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data8.xml
might want... Thank you.

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data70.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data55.xml

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data109.xml

For this particular deployment, my technical knowledge all came from OJT
prior to the deployment. As this was also a NATO deployment, I was outside
the typical USAF realm and required specific skills which were non-trainable,
i.e. how to deal with foreign military members and training them in proper
security procedures when their nation does not put the same emphasis on it.
I deployed under a unique UTC that has never been called to deploy to SWA
(ever). This type of job was normally performed by civilian engineers in our
unit. Our team went through a crash course training weeks prior to
departure. Since it was the first deployment for that UTC, we had no basis
on what to expect (to perform in that type of condition), what we need to
make it a successful deployment. However, the team was able perform well
with the minimal training we received. There are times when we were asked
to perform tasks that were outside the scope of the UTC MISCAP. In those
cases, we depended on our home base reach back support.
Knowledge of Air Force long-haul communications does not adequately
prepare you for the tactical communications systems the Army / Marines use
that is often held together with wire and sandbags! More tactical
communications knowledge is needed and NOT just Air Force, but all
systems in use! Frequency / Satellite management was also something I
would have liked more knowledge of prior to arrival in the AOR.
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Survey Response Number Section B_Question 2_KSA Additional Comments
My last deployment was pretty focused in scope and probably a bad example
of what I needed to know to be effective in the field. My first two were much
more challenging. While technical training is important from a background
standpoint, there is simply too much technical stuff out there for one person
to be proficient in everything you will be hit with and in my case researching,
learning just enough and implementing was a standard routine. The things
that helped me were a solid fundamentals background (modulation, signal
flow, troubleshooting skills, a basic overview of major components/systems
and what they do), a knowledge of resources available for help (google, AFIs,
governing guidance, & who does what on the A-staff, wing, CAOC, &
combined/joint force structure in AOR), knowing who you had to coordinate
with and finally problem solving skills. There is very little that I have used
and applied in the Air Force that has come from a formal or deliberate
training program, but rather through OJT or self study while trying to tackle a
given problem. The more problems tackled and the greater the reach in
terms of coordination, staffing, finding the SMEs, etc. the more useful the
knowledge will be for you later... I have just had a good variety.

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data16.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data117.xml

Another observation that may need to be looked at isn't necessarily trying to
assess what technical training folks need to handle all the things that are
thrown at them, but to focus rather on what can be accomplished during
deliberate planning that can preclude the number of heroes you need in the
field.
It would be nice to have more courses dealing with either deployed comm or
stationary satcom. That's all I dealt with at Al Udeid and deployed was my
first exposure.
Telecommunications principles, VoIP in deployed environment, DISA TSOs,
Configuration Management principles and configuration management tools.
Communications planning principles for receiving inbound units into
established network in deployed environment.
I think I was technically prepared on my deployment because I had been
exposed on the job to many of the skills needed. Many of the skills I did have
to learn, however came painfully. Formal training on new and upcoming
technologies has been lacking. The civilian contractor counterparts I work
with have a more solid hands-on background. The enlisted force I have
worked with are sent to regular training (as they should) within their field.
The breadth of communications for military officers including AF, Army, and
Navy branches often puts us in the position that we often fall behind in our
ability to understand and employ the technology we are expected to make
decisions upon. As a result, we tend to be more risk adverse when we come
to implementing new technologies then I would say I see in the commercial
world.

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data98.xml

My current deployment has me working with a large contractor force
implementing the whole range of communications except for LMRs and
airfield systems in Baghdad. Although, I don't believe I will know and
understand everything I need in this vast career field, certain in depth areas
of expertise gained by formal schooling or certifications would have been
very useful.
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Survey Response Number Section B_Question 2_KSA Additional Comments
Other than BCOT and ACOT, everything else has been OJT and being at the
right place at the right time.
Deployed Requirements
Additionally I always had a great team to work with and that is the main
reason as to why things went well most of the time
Survey_data5.xml
Was J6 at JTF task force as LtC. Felt my background and experience was
more than enough for job... however, have always felt that AF does not do
enough training for 33S officers, and specifically technical training to keep
abreast of IT. Hard to find time and money to go to various tech refresh
classes. In my view, best if AETC could built more "technical training" into
ACOT course, expand course, discuss to some depth (but not too much)
Deployed Requirements
issues such as data networks, IP protocol, ports and protocols, firewalls,
Survey_data104.xml
switches, routers, VPNs, voice networks, voice over IP, etc., etc., etc.
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data66.xml

Did not really act as Frequency management chief during the deployment.
Had 1-2 week notice (volunteered) for a 365-day TDY to Baghdad - staff
work (deputy in operations) did not require too much technical work.
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Appendix D: Individual Mean KSA Critical Values by Core Skill Group
Respondent Mean Criticality Values by Core Knowledge Area
Level of Importance: 1-Minor, 2-Limited Benefit, 3-Useful, 4-Necessary, 5-Critical
Primary Area(s) of Responsibility During Last
Deployment

Core Skill Sets Used During Last Deployment

1.60

1.60
2.75

2.50

2.46

1.90

1.40

1.60

1.00

Other_Comments
X Executive Officer duties

X

2.83

Other

1.20

Mission Sys

2.00

Comm P&I

2.00

Multi Media

Net Ops Net Inf Info Mgmt Multi Media Comm I&P Mission Sys

Info Mgmt

Net Inf

Net Ops

Survey Response
Number
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data1.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data10.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data100.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data101.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data102.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data103.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data104.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data105.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data106.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data108.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data109.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data110.xml

X
1.15

X

Client Support
X Administration

X

1.33

Executive officer

3.18

3.33

2.30

3.40

3.20

3.00

2.75

3.00

1.50

2.17

2.38

3.00

3.00

2.92

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

1.69

X

3.15

3.00

3.40

2.00

2.67

2.92

X

2.75

2.40

1.00

1.30

1.50

1.31

X

2.85

3.80

1.60

2.10

3.00

2.31

X

X

4.20

4.70

1.80

1.00

3.50

4.46

X

X
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X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

Respondent Mean Criticality Values by Core Knowledge Area
Level of Importance: 1-Minor, 2-Limited Benefit, 3-Useful, 4-Necessary, 5-Critical
Primary Area(s) of Responsibility During Last
Deployment

Core Skill Sets Used During Last Deployment

2.25

2.00

1.00

1.20

2.50

2.17

2.90

2.90

1.00

1.00

2.17

2.31

X

X

2.55

1.00

3.20

1.50

1.00

2.15

X

X

X

2.58

3.00

X

X

X

2.05

1.60

4.00

4.14

3.10

2.30

2.20

4.35

4.80

4.00

4.00

2.67

1.20

X

1.30

1.50

2.46

4.50

4.00

2.00

1.50

1.00

1.60

5.00

4.46

1.00

4.33

3.75

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

2.40

1.50

3.20

3.10

2.15

1.00

1.23
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X
X Wing Exec

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

2.40

Other_Comments

X

4.40
1.00

Other

1.00

Mission Sys

1.00

Comm P&I

1.00

Multi Media

Net Ops Net Inf Info Mgmt Multi Media Comm I&P Mission Sys

Info Mgmt

Net Inf

Net Ops

Survey Response
Number
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data116.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data117.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data118.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data120.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data121.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data122.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data16.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data2.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data20.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data26.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data28.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data31.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data32.xml

X
X

X
X

X

X

Respondent Mean Criticality Values by Core Knowledge Area
Level of Importance: 1-Minor, 2-Limited Benefit, 3-Useful, 4-Necessary, 5-Critical
Primary Area(s) of Responsibility During Last
Deployment

Core Skill Sets Used During Last Deployment

2.00

4.83

3.50

4.10

1.20

1.60

3.00

2.40

1.20

1.60
3.10

2.75

4.00

3.31

X
X
X

1.00

1.00

1.25

3.00

2.33

3.15

X
X

X
X Executive Officer

X

X
Additional Duty:
Motorola radios, cell
X phones
Executive officer at Grp
X level

2.50

2.65

3.20

4.08

4.14

2.00

2.90

Other_Comments

X

4.00

1.50

Other

2.00

Mission Sys

2.40

Comm P&I

3.05

Multi Media

Net Ops Net Inf Info Mgmt Multi Media Comm I&P Mission Sys

Info Mgmt

Net Inf

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data37.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data38.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data39.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data4.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data43.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data44.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data45.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data48.xml

Net Ops

Survey Response
Number
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data33.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data34.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data35.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data36.xml

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
4.00

3.89

5.00

3.20

X
X
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X

X
Database and
X Webpage Mgt

Respondent Mean Criticality Values by Core Knowledge Area
Level of Importance: 1-Minor, 2-Limited Benefit, 3-Useful, 4-Necessary, 5-Critical
Primary Area(s) of Responsibility During Last
Deployment

Core Skill Sets Used During Last Deployment

2.75

2.40

2.50

3.08

X

2.00

X

X

X

2.20
4.00

2.50

2.60

2.00

1.90

3.00

2.46

1.20

1.50

1.00

1.00

1.33

2.77

X

3.60

3.95

3.50

4.00

X

X

X

X Radio Direction Finding

2.83
4.33

X

Other_Comments

X

4.33

3.74

X

Other

2.33

3.80

Mission Sys

2.40

Comm P&I

3.00

Multi Media

Net Ops Net Inf Info Mgmt Multi Media Comm I&P Mission Sys

Info Mgmt

Net Inf

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data6.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data60.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data65.xml

Net Ops

Survey Response
Number
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data5.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data50.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data52.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data53.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data54.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data55.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data57.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data58.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data59.xml

1.20

4.17

X
4.42

3.20

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Staff Officer: Briefed
CENTCOM CC on
X coalition issues

X

1.95

2.00

1.20

1.00

1.00

1.00

3.00

4.00

3.00

4.00

4.00

4.90
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X
X

X SATCOM

Respondent Mean Criticality Values by Core Knowledge Area
Level of Importance: 1-Minor, 2-Limited Benefit, 3-Useful, 4-Necessary, 5-Critical
Primary Area(s) of Responsibility During Last
Deployment

Core Skill Sets Used During Last Deployment

1.00

1.00

1.00

Other

1.00

Mission Sys

1.00

Comm P&I

1.00

Multi Media

Net Ops Net Inf Info Mgmt Multi Media Comm I&P Mission Sys

Info Mgmt

Net Inf

Deployed Requirements
Survey_data66.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data67.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data68.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data69.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data7.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data70.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data71.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data72.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data74.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data77.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data8.xml
Deployed Requirements
Survey_data80.xml

Net Ops

Survey Response
Number

Other_Comments
Deputy Chief, CIS
Operations for MNF-I in a generalized way,
X covered all
X Air Ops

4.36

4.63

3.50

3.20

1.40

5.00
1.00

1.30

3.00

X
3.15

X

3.00

X

1.60

X

3.05

4.80

1.80

2.60

1.83

2.65

2.22

1.00

1.80

4.00

3.40

1.80

1.40

3.15

2.80

1.00

2.50

3.45

3.30

4.00

3.40

3.53

3.11

4.15

X Information Security
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